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THE CONTINUED VITALITY OF STRUCTURED SENTENCING
FOLLOWING BLAKELY: THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES
John F. Pfaff
In two recent opinions, Blakely v. Washington and United States v. Booker,
the U.S. Supreme Court effectively invalidated the binding nature of sentencing
guidelines used by many states and the federal government over the past thirty years.
Not surprisingly, numerous commentators have asserted that Blakely and Booker
profoundly altered the nature of sentencing in the United States. But these claims have
been made without any meaningful empirical consideration of whether viable
alternatives exist.
This Article fills that gap. It explores the extent to which voluntary, nonbinding
criminal sentencing guidelines influence the sentencing behavior of state trial judges.
In particular, it focuses on the ability of such guidelines to encourage judges to
sentence consistently and to avoid "impermissibly" taking into account a defendant's
race or sex. It also compares such guidelines to the binding guidelines found con-
stitutionally impermissible in Blakely and Booker.
In general, the results indicate that voluntary guidelines are able to accomplish
much, though not all, that binding guidelines did, especially with respect to sentence
variation. For example, voluntary guidelines appear to reduce a measure of variation
in sentence length by as much as 35 percent for violent crimes and 21 percent for
property crimes. By comparison, the analogous results for binding guidelines are a
57 percent drop for violent crimes and a 54 percent drop for property crimes. For the
use of impermissible factors, the results are more ambiguous; binding guidelines
appear in general to be slightly more effective than voluntary, but not consistently, and
voluntary guidelines still appear to reduce the role of race and sex at sentencing.
Voluntary guidelines are not the only option available to the states in a post-
Blakely world: States can rely on sentencing juries or forms of expanded mandatory
minimums, for example. And it remains an open empirical question whether, in the
end, voluntary guidelines work better than these alternatives. But voluntary guide-
lines nonetheless appear to be a viable, albeit somewhat less effective, alternative to
presumptive guidelines in the wake of Blakely and Booker.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past thirty years, nineteen states and the federal government
have attempted to constrain judges' discretion when sentencing criminals by
adopting what are called "presumptive" guidelines or "determinate" sentenc-
ing rules. Though the particular designs of these systems vary, they all share a
common basic structure: A crime is assigned a range of sentences by the leg-
islature, and a judge can deviate from that range only by identifying particular
aggravating or mitigating factors. Thus, a crime like kidnapping might warrant
a prison term ranging from ten to fifteen years, with a judge having the discre-
tion to lower the minimum only if he finds that the crime was committed in a
fit of passion, or to raise the maximum only if he finds that the criminal used
a gun during the crime.
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The U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Blakely v. Washington'
called these presumptive guidelines and determinate sentencing regimes into
question. The Court held that a jury (not a judge) must find any fact required
to impose a sentence higher than the statute would otherwise allow.2 Thus,
while presumptive guidelines and determinate sentencing regimes formerly
empowered the judge to identify on his own any aggravating factor such as the
use of a gun, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment denies the judge this
sort of authority; juries must find all relevant facts, not only those that define
the crime in the first place, but also those that establish the upper boundary
of the sentencing range.
Many commentators have heralded (or lamented) Blakely, along with its
affirmation in United States v. Booker,' as introducing a sea change in sentenc-
ing practices.4 But these claims overstate the practical importance of Blakely's
holding because they pay too little attention to the power of voluntary sentenc-
ing guidelines. This is my point of departure: Whereas mandatory fact-finding
by judges is impernissible after Blakely, suggested fact-finding is perfectly accept-
able.' In other words, a guideline regime that sets the default penalty for kidnap-
ping at ten to fifteen years and requires a judge to find an aggravating fact, such
as the use of a gun, before imposing a higher sentence does not survive Blakely,
but one that only encourages the judge to impose a sentence of ten to fifteen
years for kidnapping unless he finds aggravating factors does survive. This is
perhaps an awkward line, but it is one the Court accepts.' As discussed in
more depth below, the Court's opinion in Blakely rests on the idea that
presumptive guidelines and determinate sentencing regimes create binding
1. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
2. The holding in Blakely is asymmetric: The jury requirement applies only to upward
enhancements, and states can still require judicial fact-finding for downward departures. This is
discussed in more depth infra Part I.B.
3. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
4. Kevin Reitz recently noted that "Blakely has been likened to a legal earthquake, a forty-car
pileup, a bombshell, and a bull in a china shop. It has been called the most significant constitutional
decision in criminal justice since Miranda-and some have opined that its full force will be greater than
any past ruling in the field." Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional
Law at Cross-Purposes, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1086 (2005) (footnote omitted).
5. In Blakely, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "[o]f course indeterminate schemes
involve judicial factfinding, in that a judge... may implicitly rule on those facts he deems important to
the exercise of his sentencing discretion. But the facts do not pertain to whether the defendant has a
legal right to a lesser sentence-and that makes all the difference insofar as judicial impingement
upon the traditional role of the jury is concerned." Blakely, 542 U.S. at 309.
6. In Booker, the Court "severed and excised" the portion of the federal code that made
the federal sentencing guidelines mandatory, making the guidelines "effectively advisory." Booker,
543 U.S. at 245.
expectations that only juries can break.' Since suggestive guidelines do not
create such expectations, they are not vulnerable to Blakely concerns.
This line, then, provides a straightforward way to recraft presumptive
guidelines so that they comply with Blakely: Make them voluntary. In fact, seven
states already used these types of guidelines before the Court issued Blakely,
and the federal guidelines are no longer binding following Booker. On the sur-
face, these voluntary guidelines appear to differ strongly from presumptive
guidelines and determinate sentencing rules (which I will refer to collectively
as "presumptive guidelines").8  (hile a judge's failure to adhere to presump-
tive guidelines is appealable, no such recourse exists under voluntary guide-
lines. This seems to imply that judges have, and therefore will take advantage
of, much more latitude under voluntary guidelines, undermining such
guidelines' ability to regulate judicial sentencing behavior, such as the extent to
which judges sentence consistently and without "impermissible" reference to
the race and sex of defendants. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales expressed
this very fear in a speech in Chicago in the summer of 2005.9
Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that some commentators such as Michael
Tonry have argued that voluntary guidelines do little good.'" But actually there
are several reasons to expect judges to follow voluntary guidelines at least roughly
as closely as presumptive guidelines. The first is that voluntary guidelines, like
presumptive guidelines, provide information to judges. The guideline ranges
serve as benchmarks for judges who wish to sentence consistently and without
relying on impermissible factors but who, for various (possibly subconscious)
reasons, fail to do so. Furthermore, the guidelines provide judges with a metric
by which to evaluate other judges' sentencing behavior, helping the judiciary to
develop and enforce informal norms of guideline compliance.
7. See discussion infra Part III.A.
8. This is for ease of discussion. In practice, the differences between presumptive guidelines
and determinate sentencing rules are more style than substance. Under both, the law defines ranges of
acceptable presumptive sentences, and judges are allowed to deviate from them only when certain
conditions are met. That some use grids and other do not, for example, is not substantively important.
9. Specifically, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales said that "I fear it is inevitable over time
that, with so many different individual judges involved, exercising their own individual discretion,
in so many different jurisdictions, even greater disparities among sentences will occur under a system
of advisory guidelines." Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Att'y Gen., Prepared Remarks at the American Bar
Association House of Delegates (Aug. 8, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2005/
080805agamericanbarassoc.htm.
10. Michael Tony, one of the leading scholars on sentencing law and policy, once dismissed
voluntary guidelines as ineffective, claiming that "[elvaluations showed that voluntary guidelines
typically had little or no demonstrable effect on sentences imposed"; Tonry did admit, however, that those
in Delaware may have had some effect. See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERs 27-28 (1996).
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The second possible reason why judges may adhere to voluntary guide-
lines is that they operate in the shadow of presumptive guidelines. Judges know
that legislatures can step in and make voluntary guidelines presumptive. Even
in this post-Blakely world, such shadows exist, since legislatures can shift the
required fact-finding to juries, or they can take advantage of the asymmetry in
Blakely (namely that the jury requirement applies only to upward, not
downward, adjustments) to develop Blakely-compliant binding guidelines." To
the extent that these approaches are less appealing to legislatures than the
more traditional (but now invalid) presumptive guidelines, the threat may not
be as powerful as it was before Blakely, but it is viable nonetheless.
And the third reason state judges may adhere to voluntary guidelines (and
the focus of this Article is on state, not federal, sentencing) is that their careers
may depend on it. For example, judges in Virginia, a voluntary guideline state,
are appointed and retained by the legislature, and they thus may have an
incentive to follow the legislatively created guidelines. It is also possible that
promotions to higher courts could be conditioned on whether judges comply
with guidelines.
With Blakely and Booker invalidating presumptive guidelines, it is critical
that we examine whether voluntary guidelines in fact work, not with anecdotes
and supposition, but with data. To date, no article appears to have provided a
rigorous empirical assessment of voluntary guidelines. 2 This Article fills this
significant gap in the literature, testing the hypothesis that voluntary guidelines
are capable of achieving the goals that presumptive guidelines were designed to
accomplish. In particular, I focus on two measures of "success": (1) To what
extent do voluntary guidelines reduce the variation in imposed sentence
lengths; and (2) to what extent do they reduce the use of "impermissible"
factors such as race and sex?
In general, the results I find are consistent with the hypothesis that vol-
untary guidelines can successfully confront the very problems presumptive
guidelines were adopted to address, albeit perhaps not as well. For example,
when the states I examine adopt voluntary guidelines, the decline in the
variation in sentence lengths is between 9 percent and 35 percent; when they
adopt presumptive guidelines, it is between 10 percent and 57 percent. For the
11. Part III.B discusses these alternatives in more depth.
12. This absence has been noted by other commentators as well. Kim Hunt and Michael
Connelly, both executive directors of sentencing commissions in voluntary guideline jurisdictions
(the District of Columbia and Wisconsin, respectively), recently stated that "[given that advisory sys-
tems have rarely undergone rigorous independent review, it goes without saying that advisory guidelines
have not been subjected to controlled experiments." Kim S. Hunt & Michael Connelly, Advisory
Guidelines in the Post-Blakely Era, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 233, 241 n.46 (2005).
sentences imposed on those convicted of property crimes, voluntary guidelines
appear to reduce variation by as much as 21 percent, and presumptive
guidelines by as little as 13 percent and as much as 54 percent. And similar
patterns exist when we look at the sentences for drug offenders. The adoption of
voluntary guidelines is correlated with declines in variation between 3 percent
and 31 percent, and that of presumptive guidelines with drops between 22 per-
cent and 65 percent.
Similarly, both voluntary and presumptive guidelines appear to reduce
the extent to which judges look to a defendant's race and sex when imposing
sentence. Again, in general, presumptive guidelines appear to outperform volun-
tary guidelines, but voluntary guidelines still have salutary effects. In several
cases, voluntary guidelines are at least half as effective as presumptive guide-
lines. In two situations, they appear even three-quarters or equally as useful.
These results better allow us to think through the relative benefits of the
proposals being floated following Blakely and Booker to reform structured sen-
tencing. Making guidelines voluntary is not the only option-as discussed
below, legislatures can turn to approaches such as sentencing juries, stricter
sentencing laws that allow no upward adjustments by judges, and regimes that
look like moving sets of mandatory minimums. And several of these systems
have the appeal of retaining some presumptive elements. But these options risk
imposing significant costs as well, and without a clear and rigorous under-
standing of the effectiveness of voluntary guidelines, it is impossible to decide if
these options make policy sense.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I provides an overview of modem
sentencing reforms and Blakely's likely impact on them. Part II then examines
the relative efficacy of voluntary and presumptive guidelines. In particular, it
develops two tests: One considers how the variation in sentence length changes
following the adoption of voluntary or presumptive guidelines, and the other
how judicial reliance on a defendant's race and sex at sentencing changes
after such adoption. Part III in turn examines the other alternatives to presump-
tive guidelines that have been proposed since Blakely and discusses some of
the tradeoffs between these options and voluntary guidelines.
I. THE SCOPE AND IMPACT OF BLAKELY
The dissents in Blakely and much of the subsequent commentary suggest
that the decision may profoundly alter or undermine the sentencing reforms of
the past thirty years. Such claims both understate the diversity of reforms
enacted since the 19 70s and overstate BIakely's effect on them. This part starts
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with a brief history of modern sentencing reform and then examines the
particular state structures threatened by Blakely.
A. A Brief History of Sentencing Reform
The nature of criminal sentencing in the United States has undergone
an important shift since the 1970s. At the start of that decade, sentencing was
dominated by the indetenninate approach: Prisoners were sentenced by
judges to wide ranges of years (in some states, such as California, a criminal
could receive a sentence of one year to life), 3 and parole boards determined
when in fact prisoners were released. During the 1970s, however, indetermi-
nacy was attacked on several fronts. First, and perhaps most important, judges
and academics alike, led by Andrew von Hirsch and Judge Marvin Frankel,
began to view indeterminate sentences as too arbitrary, as "law without
order." 4 Similarly situated defendants could receive dramatically different sen-
tences based on which judge each faced or which day each appeared before a
given judge. And there was a growing concern that, either consciously or uncon-
sciously, judges were taking into account impermissible factors such as
defendants' race and sex when meting out punishments. Second, to the extent
that it was justified on reformative or psychotherapeutic grounds, indetenninacy
became less appealing as people turned against the rehabilitative ideal. 6 And
third, conservative critics feared that indeterminate sentences undermined the
deterrent power of the law.'7 Under the weight of these assaults, the old system
began to collapse.
13. In Ex parte Jordan, 212 P. 913 (Cal. 1923), for example, the California Supreme Court
acknowledged that the sentence for robbery in California could range anywhere from one year to life
in prison.
14. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976); MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES (1973).
15. Susan Klein and Jordan Steiker, for example, argue that a growing literature on the
pernicious influence of race, sex, and other factors at sentencing "led to a rallying cry of conservative
and liberal judges and policy makers behind Judge Marvin Frankel." Susan R. Klein & Jordan M.
Steiker, The Search for Equality in Criminal Sentencing, 2002 Sup. CT. REV. 223, 230.
16. Edgardo Rotman notes that open-ended sentences were justified in part by viewing
prisoners as patients: Doctors do not release patients until they are healthy. Edgardo Rotman, The
Failure of Reform: United States, 1865-1965, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON 169, 178-79
(Norval Morris & David Rothman eds., 1995). David Garland discusses the rise of the antirehabilitative
"nothing works" school. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 61-63 (2001). Interestingly,
he demonstrates that the backlash against rehabilitation began before much data on its inefficacy
was gathered. Id. at 63-65.
17. See MICHAEL TONRY, supra note 10, at 9 (citing JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING
ABOUT CRIME (1975)).
The result was the fragmenting of correctional policy in the United
States, with every state curtailing its indeterminate system to at least some
degree, but with each state responding differently. 8 From the 1970s through
today, six general types of sentencing reforms gained popularity: (1) the crea-
tion of determinate sentencing systems; (2) the development of sentencing
guidelines; (3) the imposition of mandatory minimums; 9 (4) the passage of
two- and three-strikes laws (which are essentially forms of mandatory mini-
mums for repeat offenders); (5) the abolition of parole; and (6) the adoption of
truth-in-sentencing laws. Table 1 shows the wide variation in policies adopted
across the United States.
TABLE 1
STATE SENTENCING PRACTICES
State Abolish Parole Guidelines [ etning Strike LawsSentencing
Alabama
Alaska 1980
Arizona 1994 1977 1994
Arkansas 1994 1995
California 1976 1994 1994
Colorado 1979 1994
Connecticut 1995 1994
Delaware 1990 1987 1990
District
of Columbia 2000
1983,
Florida 1983 abolished 1998 1995 1995
Georgia 1995 1995
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois 1978 1970s 1995
Indiana 1977 1976 1994
Iowa 1996
Kansas 1993 1993 1995 1994
18. For works discussing this fracturing, see Michael Tonry, Nat'l Inst. of Justice,
Reconsidering Indeterminate and Structured Sentencing, SENT'G & CORRECTIONS, Sept. 1999, at 1,
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/175722.pdf; Norval Morris, The Contemporary Prison:
1965-Present, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 16, at 216-18; Kevin R. Reitz,
The Disassembly and Reassembly of U.S. Sentencing Practices, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN
WESTERN COUNTRIES 222 (Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds., 2001); Michael Tonry, U.S.
Sentencing Systems Fragmenting (Aug. 1999), reprinted in PENAL REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES
21 (Michael Tonry ed., 2001).
19. Mandatory minimums are the most widely adopted reforms, employed in some form by
the federal government, all fifty states, and the District of Columbia.
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State Abolish Parole Guidelines Truth-rn- Strike LawsSentencing
Kentucky
1992,
Louisiana abolished 1995 1997 1994
Maine 1975 1995
Maryland 1983 1994
Massachusetts
Michigan 1999 1995
Minnesota 1980 1980 1993
Mississippi 1995 1995
Missouri 1997 1994
Montana 1995
Nebraska
Nevada 1995
New Hampshire
New Jersey 1978 1997 1995
New Mexico 1977 1994
New York 1995
North Carolina 1994 1994 1994 1994
North Dakota 1995 1995
Ohio 1996 1996 1996
Oklahoma 1998
Oregon 1989 1989 1995
Pennsylvania 1982 1911 1995
Rhode Island
South Carolina 1996 1995
South Dakota
Tennessee 1989 1995 1995
Texas
Utah 1979 1985 1995
Vermont 1995
Virginia 1995 1995 1995 1994
Washington 1984 1984 1990 1993
West Virginia
1985,
abolished 1995,
Wisconsin 1999 reinstated 2003 1994
Wyoming I
Notes. Dates are the years of implementation. States listed here as adopting
truth-in-sentencing laws are those that require prisoners to serve at least 85 percent of
their sentences. For a more complete list, see infra note 33.
Under determinate sentencing, state legislatures establish either specific
sentences or ranges of sentences that judges are required to impose. Though
some discretion might remain with the judge, it is greatly limited. The most rigid
of these systems is California's, in which a judge is often given three possible sen-
tences (say, four, six, or eight years) and is expected to impose the middle sen-
tence unless mitigating factors suggest the lower or aggravating factors the
higher." In the 1970s, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Indiana, Illinois,
New Jersey, New Mexico, and North Carolina adopted such systems.2" Though
seemingly popular in the 1970s, no state has adopted such an approach since
1980,22 and at least one state, North Carolina, ultimately replaced its determi-
nate structure with presumptive guidelines.
Instead, like North Carolina, jurisdictions have favored guidelines and
sentencing commissions. Minnesota adopted the first guideline system in 1980,
and since then nineteen jurisdictions have adopted guidelines, though only
seventeen currently employ them; nine use presumptive guidelines, eight vol-
untary.23 Five other states currently use commissions though as of 2006 had yet
to adopt guidelines.24 The central difference between the two types is that
under presumptive guidelines, judicial failure to adhere to the guidelines is
appealable by both the defendant and the government, while no such appeal
exists for voluntary guidelines. Besides their ability to rationalize sentencing,
guidelines and commissions appeal to legislators for two central reasons: They
allow a degree of coordinated policy planning not possible when judges and
parole boards make case-by-case decisions, and they provide a measure of politi-
cal insulation to (at least partially) shield criminal policy from sudden outbursts
of public opinion.
20. See Reitz, supra note 18, at 224.
21. See id. at 225; Jon Wool & Don Stemen, Vera Inst. of Justice, State Sentencing & Corr.,
Aggravated Sentencing: Blakely v. Washington, POL'Y & PRAC. REV., Aug. 2004, at 3, available at
http://www.vera.org/publication-.pdf/242-456.pdf. These laws are discussed in more depth infra Part I.C.
22. Tonry asserts that "no state known to me... has adopted a statutory determinate-
sentencing system for nearly fifteen years." TONRY, supra note 10, at 28.
23. The nine states with presumptive guidelines are Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Washington. The remaining eight
jurisdictions with voluntary guidelines are Arkansas, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maryland,
Missouri, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Florida adopted guidelines in 1983 but abolished them by
the end of 1997, and Louisiana adopted guidelines in 1992 but abolished them in 1995.
24. As of June 2006, jurisdictions with sentencing commissions are Alabama, Alaska,
Arkansas, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Mexico, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See National Association of State Sentencing
Commissions, Contact List (June 2006), http://www.ussc.gov/states/nascaddr.htm. Rachel Barkow
and Kathleen O'Neill provide a good summary of state sentencing commissions, including those
that have since been disbanded. Rachel Barkow & Kathleen M. O'Neill, Delegating Punitive Power: The
Political Economy of Sentencing Commissions and Guideline Formation, 84 TEx. L. REV. tbl. 1 (forthcoming
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=905330.
54 UCLA LAW REVIEW 235 (2006)244
The Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing 245
Besides using guidelines, states have sought to restrain judicial discretion
at sentencing through mandatory minimums. Despite trenchant theoretical
and pragmatic attacks, 5 repeat offenders often face elevated minimum sanc-
tions, and mandatory minimums have also targeted violent offenders and those
convicted of violating drug and firearm statutes.26 The most high profile of
these policies are the "three-strikes" laws adopted by twenty-five jurisdictions.
These laws require that an offender serve a dramatically increased sentence fol-
lowing a third (or, for two-strikes laws, a second) conviction. In general, strike
legislation has been used more for political gain than actual crime control: Of
the twenty-five jurisdictions with such laws, only one uses them regularly,
California, which is responsible for approximately 90 percent of all sentences
under them.s The lower-profile mandatory minimums are thus more important.
At the same time that legislatures have limited judicial discretion over
sentence length at the front end of the process, they have also sought to con-
strain discretion, usually that of the parole board, at the back end. Two policies
in particular have been implemented to limit discretion over the actual release
date. The first is the abolition of parole. Starting with Maine in 1975, fourteen
states and the federal government to varying degrees abolished parole boards
and their ability to release prisoners early. 9 All but three of these states elimi-
nated discretionary parole release for all offenders. The second is the passage of
truth-in-sentencing laws, which require inmates to serve a specific percentage
of their sentences) Many truth-in-sentencing laws came into effect following
25. See, e.g., JUSTICE KENNEDY COMM'N, AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 1 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/kennedy/Punishment.pdf ("mhe
American Bar Association urges that states, territories and the federal government ... [riepeal
mandatory rainimum sentence statutes .... ); David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating
Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 110 YALE L.J. 733, 737 (2001).
26. See Reitz, supra note 18, at 229.
27. The twenty-five are the United States, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See John Clark, James Austin & D. Alan Henry,
Nat'l Inst. of Justice, "Three Strikes and You're Out": A Review of State Legislation, RESEARCH IN
BRIEF, Sept. 1997, at 7-9, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/l65369.pdf.
28. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of California's
Two- and Three-Strikes Legislation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 159-60 (2002).
29. The fourteen states are Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine,
Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. See PAULA
M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT:
TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 3 tbl.2 (Jan. 1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf.
30. See NAT'L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE LEGISLATIVE
ACTIONS ON TRUTH IN SENTENCING: A REVIEW OF LAW AND LEGISLATION IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1994 (1995). In states that
impose a range of years at sentencing, the focus is on the minimum sentence. Id. at 3.
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the passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
which provides federal funds to states that adopt an 85 percent standard" for
violent offenders, the focus of most (though not all) state truth-in-sentencing
laws. 2 As of 1998, twenty-eight states had adopted the 85 percent level
required for federal funds, and thirteen states had imposed other (generally
lesser) standards. Though the financial incentives offered by the federal gov-
ernment are often extensive-in 1998, for example, the government awarded
over $92 million to just eleven states in the South, including $32 million to
Florida alone-many states have declined to adopt truth-in-sentencing laws due
to prison capacity constraints. 4
Finally, it should be noted that the reforms of the past thirty years have
focused not only on the issue of how to structure prison sentences, but also on
how to develop alternative, nonincarceratory ("intermediate") sanctions.
Several options have been considered, including boot camps, intensive super-
vision, house arrests and electronic monitoring, day fines or day reporting
centers, community service, and fines. 5 Faced with limited capacity and lim-
ited budgets, states have experimented widely with alternatives to imprison-
ment. While cogent criticisms have been leveled against many of these
policies,36 they remain important elements of the reform movement of the
past three decades.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 13704 (2000).
32. See generally, NAT'L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 30, which provides a
comprehensive survey of the truth-in-sentencing laws in place in 1995.
33. The twenty-eight jurisdictions that adopted the 85 percent rule are Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and
Washington, with Illinois qualifying in 1996 only. Four states (Indiana, Maryland, Nebraska, and
Texas) adopted a 50 percent rule, and three (Idaho, Nevada, and New Hampshire) require that the defen-
dant serve 100 percent of his minimum sentence. Six other states adopted idiosyncratic rules: these
are Alaska (100 percent of sentence, at least two-thirds in prison), Arkansas (70 percent for some violent
crimes and one drug offense (manufacture of methamphetamine)), Colorado (75 percent for those with
two priors, 56.25 percent for those with one), Kentucky (a form of 85 percent), Massachusetts (75 percent
of the minimum), and Wisconsin (as of 2000, 100 percent of the term with extended supervision of 25 per-
cent of the sentence). See DITTON & WILSON, supra note 29, at 2 tbl.1.
34. The data on grants to the South are from Todd Edwards, Sentencing Reform in Southern States: A
Review of Truth-in-Sentencing and Three-Strike Measures, 72 SPECTRUM 10 (Fall 1999). For a discussion on
state unwillingness to qualify for the grants, see NAT'L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 30, at 8, 9, 25.
35. For a detailed discussion of how these alternatives operate and the (often limited) extent
to which they have been successful, see TONRY, supra note 10, at 108.
36. Tonry, for example, notes the problem of "net-widening," in which an intermediate
punishment regime results in more people overall falling under the control of the criminal justice
system. Id. at 130-31.
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B. Sentencing Practices Threatened by Blakely
In Blakely, the Supreme Court faced only one of the reforms described in
Part L.A, namely Washington State's presumptive guideline system. These
guidelines specified for each offense a "standard range" that was less than the
statutory maximum for that crime; a judge could impose a sentence above that
range (and below or equal to the statutory maximum) only if he found certain
aggravating factors, and these factors had to be ones "other than those which
are used in computing the standard range sentence for the offense." 7 Blakely,
for example, was charged with second-degree kidnapping, which carried a
statutory maximum sentence of ten years but a "standard range" of forty-nine to
fifty-three months. Based on facts he found about the nature of Blakely's crime,
however, the judge sentenced him to ninety months, well below the statutory
maximum but nearly twice the fifty-three months the judge could have
imposed without an additional finding. The Court reversed the enhanced
sentence as a violation of the Sixth Amendment, holding that the triggering
facts had to found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Though the decision in Blakely struck many observers as surprising, it had
in fact been anticipated by at least one federal district court judge, who held
the federal guidelines unconstitutional along the same lines as Blakely a week
before Blakely was issued.38 The outcome in Blakely flowed directly from two
earlier Court cases, Apprendi v. New Jersey9 and Ring v. Arizona." Apprendi
held that under the Sixth Amendment, "any fact [other than evidence of prior
convictions] that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt."4 Apprendi considered a New Jersey hate-crime statute that
allowed the judge to impose a sentence of up to twenty years if a crime was
motivated by certain group-based animosities. Although the underlying crime
of which Apprendi was convicted carried a statutory maximum of ten years,
the judge invoked the hate-crime statute and sentenced Apprendi to twelve
years; the Court reversed the sentence. 2 Ring took Apprendi one step further,
requiring that any fact necessary for the judge to increase the sentence
37. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 299 (2004) (citing State v. Gore, 21 P.3d 262, 277
(Wash. 2001)).
38. See United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 317 (D. Mass. 2004), vacated in part
by United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005), vacated by United States v. Pacheco,
434 F. 3d 106 (lst Cir. 2006).
39. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
40. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
41. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
42. Id. at 471.
imposed, even within the statutory maximum, be submitted to a jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.43 Under the Arizona law challenged in Ring, the
statutory maximum for murder was death, but a judge could impose that
maximum only if he found certain aggravating factors. The Court invalidated
the scheme, holding that under the Sixth Amendment such factors had to be
found by a jury. The parallels between the sentencing regimes under review in
Ring and Blakely are straightforward: As in Arizona, a judge in Washington
could impose a sentence outside the standard range but still within the
statutory maximum only if the judge found certain aggravating facts. Like Ring,
Blakely made it clear that only a jury could find such facts.
As a result of Blakely, most likely almost all presumptive guidelines and
several determinate sentencing regimes will have to change to conform to the
Sixth Amendment. In each of these systems judges are not allowed to deviate
from recommended sentences without making specific factual findings, and
departures made without such findings are appealable. Part I.C examines these
laws more closely.
In order to appreciate the full scope of Blakely, however, it is also impor-
tant to look at what the majority said did not fall within its reach. The Court
distinguished Blakely from another sentencing case, Williams v. New York."
In Williams, the Court upheld a death-penalty sentencing scheme that
allowed (but did not require) a judge to consider at sentencing additional facts
not proven to a jury; at all times, though, the death penalty was available to
the judge. As the Court in Williams noted, the judge could have "sentenced
[the defendant] to death giving no reason at all."45 In other words, as long as the
judge is ultimately free following conviction to set a sentence without any
subsequent findings, that sentence is acceptable under the Sixth Amendment,
Williams, and Blakely.
This exactly describes voluntary guideline regimes, which the Court
explicitly approved of in Booker. Consider, for example, the voluntary guidelines
used in Virginia. Virginia clearly states that its guidelines are discretionary, and
while it requires judges to provide written explanations for deviations from the
guidelines, "failure to follow any or all of the provisions [of the sentencing statute]
or the failure to follow any or all of the provisions [of the sentencing statute] in
the prescribed manner shall not be reviewable on appeal or the basis of any
other post-conviction relief.' 6 Maryland's voluntary guidelines statute is equally
43. Ring, 536 U.S. at 608-09.
44. 337 U.S. 241 (1949); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304-05 (2004).
45. Williams, 337 U.S. at 252; see also Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304-05.
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01(F) (LexisNexis 2006) (emphasis added).
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direct: The guidelines adopted by the state "are voluntary sentencing guidelines
that a court need not follow."47  And while Maryland requests written
explanations for departures, judges comply in only about 25 percent of the
cases.48 Thus, judges under voluntary guidelines are on a footing identical to
that discussed in Williams: They are ultimately free to impose any sentence up
to the statutory maximum without explaining their decisions.
Moreover, it is worth noting that not only are voluntary guidelines
immune to Blakely challenges, but so too are the other major sentencing
reforms of the past thirty years, namely mandatory minimums, strike legislation,
the abolition of parole, and truth-in-sentencing laws. For example, neither the
abolition of parole nor truth-in-sentencing involves any additional findings of
fact; each simply decides when an inmate can apply for parole. Mandatory
minimums and strike laws are also safe in general, though problems could arise
in particular circumstances. Blakely and its precedents held that states have
considerable latitude in restricting the floor of sentences,49 but if the mandatory
minimum following a judicial finding is greater than the upper edge of the
presumptive range absent that finding, then the imposition of the mandatory
sentence may be improper. As long as mandatory minimums fall within the
presumptive range, however, they are acceptable following Blakely; mandatory
minimums in indeterminate jurisdictions are even more secure.
Ultimately, most of the reforms of the past thirty years survive Blakely.
But it is already becoming apparent in the wake of Blakely and Booker that the
presumptive sentencing regimes used by thirteen states and the federal
government likely suffer from important constitutional defects. Since much has50
already been written about Blakely's (and Booker's) effect on the federal system,
the next subpart considers its implications for the twelve affected states (other
than Washington)."
47. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 6-211 (b) (LexisNexis 2006).
48. See Abraham BenMoshe et al., Issues in Maryland Sentencing-Judicial Compliance with
the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines: Review and Recommendations, MD. STATE COMMISSION ON
CRIM. SENT'G POL'Y, May 2001, http://www.msccsp.org/publications/issues-compliance.html.
49. The approach is clearly stated in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), which
upheld mandatory minimums following Apprendi. There, the Court argued that "[wlithin the range
authorized by the jury's verdict... the political system may channel judicial discretion-and rely
upon judicial expertise-by requiring defendants to serve minimum tenns after judges make certain
factual findings." Id. at 567.
50. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Blakely's Federal Aftermath, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 333 (2004);
Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 316 (2004).
51. Washington's guidelines are not discussed here, since Blakely itself discusses them at
some length.
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C. Blakely's Effect on Diverse State Guidelines
While seventeen states (along with the federal government) employ some
sort of determinate sentencing law or presumptive guideline system,52 Blakely
affects only thirteen of them: Four states employ sentencing regimes that do not
violate Blakely. The first, Kansas, was held up by the majority in Blakely as an
example to follow.53 Following Apprendi, the Kansas Supreme Court held the
state's sentencing practices unconstitutional,54 and the legislature responded by
introducing bifurcated trials with sentencing juries." Pennsylvania's and
Michigan's guidelines also appear to survive Blakely, since both use guidelines
only to manipulate the minimum, not maximum, sentence. As the Pennsylvania
sentencing commission has noted, "[Tihe guidelines and most mandatories apply
to minimum sentences and do not limit or control maximum sentences" and thus
comport with Blakely. 6 The Michigan Supreme Court has similarly held that its
guidelines do not violate Blakely. 7 In a sense, Pennsylvania and Michigan appear
to have already adopted a version of Frank Bowman's proposed reforms for the
federal system, which are discussed in Part III.B below.58 Finally, Illinois nomi-
nally employs a determinate sentencing regime, but its design shields it from
Blakely. The prescribed ranges a judge may consider are relatively wide, and miti-
gating and aggravating factors do not appear to allow the judge to deviate from
these ranges, but instead only provide guidance for choosing points within them.59
To limit the discussion, this subpart will not consider in depth the sentencing sys-
tems used in these four "immune" jurisdictions, nor the system formerly
employed in the state of Washington (since it is discussed in Blakely itself).
52. As discussed supra Part I.A, eight states use determinate sentencing laws and nine
presumptive guidelines.
53. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,309-10 (2004).
54. State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801,811 (Kan. 2001).
55. Even Kansas's system might be defective, however. The Kansas Supreme Court held
that only durational, not dispositional, upward departures fell within Apprendi's ambit. In other
words, a fact necessary to impose a longer sentence must be submitted to a jury, but one necessary
to impose incarceration itself (rather than a lesser type of penalty) need not be. Researchers at
the Vera Institute of justice feel that this distinction likely will not stand. See Wool & Stemen,
supra note 21, at 10 n.13.
56. ANNE SKOVE, ESQ., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, BLAKELY V. WASHINGTON:
IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE COURTS 10 (2004), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/
KIS_SentenBlakely.pdf.
57. People v. Claypool, 684 N.W.2d 278, 283-84 (Mich. 2004).
58. Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the Sentencing Guidelines: Hearing Before the S.Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 35 (2004) (statement of Frank 0. Bowman, III, M. Dale PalmerProfessor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis, Indiana) [hereinafter Hearing].59. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-1 (West Supp. 2006) (defining ranges); id. 5/5-5-3.1 to .2(defining mitigating and aggravating factors).
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Thus, twelve states besides Washington currently employ sentencing
regimes that likely run afoul of Blakely. Of these, five use presumptive guide-
lines (Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, and Tennessee), and seven
employ determinate sentencing laws (Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Indiana, New Jersey, and New Mexico).60 Note, however, that this distinction
is often one of form, not substance. Kevin Reitz, for example, classifies Ohio's
sentencing system as a "presumptive narrative guidelines (no grid)" system,
while Jon Wool and Don Stemen file Ohio under the heading "presumptive
(non-guidelines) sentencing system[ ]."' That Ohio does not use a grid like the
federal system or North Carolina does not make its system any less structured.
Sentencing inder presumptive guidelines in state courts often differs
dramatically from that in federal courts, and these differences often have impor-
tant policy implications. Perhaps the greatest difference is flexibility, as state
judges under presumptive guidelines retain much more discretion than their
federal counterparts. Oregon's system, for example, is quite permissive, appearing
to limit only upward departures. 2 Minnesota provides even less guidance,
allowing judges to depart from the prescribed range for "substantial and compel-
ling" reasons, limited only by the risk of reversal." Even more rigid states, such as
North Carolina and Tennessee, adopt less deterministic approaches than the fed-
eral guidelines. Like the other states, they allow judges to sentence anywhere in a
set upper range if they find that aggravators dominate mitigators, or in a lower
range if the opposite occurs, rather than assigning points to every aggravator or
mitigator (as is the case with the federal guidelines).
6 4
60. See Wool & Stemen, supra note 21, at 3. Jon Wool and Don Stemen also suggest that
Michigan, Pennsylvania, and some states using voluntary guidelines may be vulnerable as well. Id. at
2-3. As discussed above, the Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission and the Michigan Supreme
Court have both stated that their systems comport with Blakely's requirements. Wool and Stemen
argue that some voluntary guidelines that require judges to explain their departures could violate
Blakely if such explanations require any findings; Blakely problems would arise only if state appellate
and supreme courts interpret reporting requirements in ways that make the guidelines less voluntary
and more presumptive. They acknowledge that this outcome is unlikely. Id. at 5.
61. Reitz, supra note 18, at 226 tbl.6.1; see also Wool & Stemen, supra note 21, at 3.
62. Departures are governed by OR. ADMIN. R. 213-008-0003 (2006) (durational departures),
and OR. ADMIN. R. 213-008-0005 (dispositional departures). OR. ADMIN. R. 213-008-0003(2)
restricts upward departures to no more than double the presumptive sentence; the rule imposes no
restrictions on downward departures.
63. MINN. SENT'G GUIDELINES lI.D (2006) states that, when departing from the presumptive
sentence, "it is recommended that the judge pronounce a sentence that is proportional to the severity of
the crime for which the sentence is imposed and the offender's criminal history, and take into
consideration the purposes and underlying principles of the sentencing guidelines." Though not in
violation of Blakely, Michigan provides similarly generous departure provisions. See MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 769.34(3) (West Supp. 2006) (allowing departures); id. § 769.34( 11) (regarding appellate review).
64. For North Carolina, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.17(c) (2005). For Tennessee, see
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-35-210(c)-(e) (Supp. 2005).
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Sentencing in states usually classified as determinate sentencing states is
often quite flexible as well. Alaska, for example, sets specific sentences for
certain offenses but allows the judge great flexibility if he finds aggravators or
mitigators present;" most offenses likely do not fall within the guidelines at
all.66 In New Mexico, a judge is free after making the necessary findings to vary
a sentence by as much as one-third in the appropriate direction.6 ' The Ohio
code establishes fairly wide ranges for various felony classes and, while
stipulating that judges must sentence at the bottom of the range unless aggra-
vators are found, allows them to choose any sentence but the highest if "[tihe
court finds on the record that the shortest prison term will demean the seri-
ousness of the offender's conduct or will not adequately protect the public from
future crime by the offender or others."6 Colorado also establishes generous
presumptive ranges and permits judges to move beyond them if aggravators
or mitigators are found.69  Finally, Arizona, Indiana, and New Jersey-like
Alaska-fix specific presumptive sentences but allow judges fairly wide
discretion if aggravators or mitigators are found.
The one exception to the claim that states have relatively flexible systems
is California, which uses a determinate sentencing structure for many felonies.7
For designated offenses, three possible sentences are provided: a lower, middle,
and higher. Judges are required to impose the middle sentence unless they find
aggravating or mitigating factors present; if so, they can then move to the
65. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125 (2004) establishes presumptive sentences (not ranges, but
specific numbers of years) for certain classes of offenses, and id. § 12.55.155 provides a list of
aggravators and mitigators a judge may consider if established by clear and convincing evidence, as
well as the extent to which he can deviate from the presumptive sentence. If the presumptive
sentence is fewer than four years, the judge can reduce the sentence to zero or raise it as high as the
statutory maximum; if more than four years, the judge can cut the sentence by as much as 50 percent
or raise it as high as the statutory maximum.
66. Skove states that it appears only a small fraction of Alaskan cases fall within the
structured sentencing regime. SKOVE, supra note 56, at 8.
67. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-15.1C (2000).
68. OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.14(B)(2)-(C) (West Supp. 2006). Some of the ranges
are on the order of six or seven years. See id. § 2929.14(A).
69. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A) (2005) establishes ranges, and id. § 18-
1.3-401(6) allows the judge, after the necessary findings, to impose a sentence up to twice the
presumptive maximum or half the presumptive minimum.
70. For Arizona, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701 (2001) (fixing exact sentences); id. § 13-702(establishing ranges); id. § 13-702.01 (providing for sentences outside of the ranges set in § 13-702). For
Indiana, see, for example, IND. CODE § 35-50-2-4 (LexisNexis 2004) (establishing a presumptive
sentence of thirty years for a Class A felony, with an upper bound of twenty additional years if
aggravators dominate, and a lower bound of ten fewer years if mitigators do). For New Jersey, see N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1 (f) (West 2005) (establishing specific presumptive sentences); id. § 2C:43-6(a)
(establishing departure ranges).
71. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170-1170.16 (West 2006).
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72higher or lower sentence. Judges lack discretion as to the magnitude of the
sentence, however, since they can only select one of three fixed points.
Many state guidelines also differ from the federal guidelines in their focus on
resources. Unlike the federal government, state governments face much tighter
budget constraints and must adjust their policies accordingly. 3 Minnesota's
guidelines, for example, list four underlying principles, one of which is the need
to conserve correctional resources. 4 Oregon's guidelines similarly give such
concerns a prominent role." This attention to capacity and resources can have
powerful implications: While the federal prison population has been one of the
fastest growing in recent years, the adoption of state sentencing guidelines has
often been correlated with slower population growth. 6
Notwithstanding their flexibility, presumptive state sentencing structures
outside of Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, and Pennsylvania are still likely unconsti-
tutional following Blakely. Most obviously, the enhancement provisions are
no longer constitutional. In each of the twelve states in question, enhancements
are found by judges and not beyond a reasonable doubt.7 This is no longer
72. Id. § 1170(b).
73. It is possible, for example, that some of the growing leniency observed in state
sentencing is due not to changing values but to growing budget constraints. See, e.g., JON WOOL
& DON STEMEN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, CHANGING FORTUNES OR CHANGING ATTITUDES?
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS REFORMS IN 2003 1-2 (2004), available at http://www.vera.org/
publication pdf/226_4 3 1.pdf Kate Stith and Steven Koh note that the federal guidelines do not pay any
meaningful attention to prison resources, and argue that the Guidelines' "so-called 'prison capacity'
mandate is no mandate at all." Kate Stith & Steven Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The
Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 267 (1993).
74. MINN. SENT'G GUIDELINES 1.3 (2006) asserts:
Because the capacities of state and local correctional facilities are finite, use of
incarcerative sanctions should be limited to those convicted of more serious offenses or
those who have longer criminal histories. To ensure such usage of finite resources,
sanctions used in sentencing convicted felons should be the least restrictive necessary to
achieve the purposes of the sentence.
75. OR. ADMIN. R. 213-002-0001(3)(a) (2006) states:
The response of the corrections system to crime, and to violation of post-prison and
probation supervision, must reflect the resources available for that response. A corrections
system that overruns its resources is a system that cannot deliver its threatened punishment
or its rehabilitative impact. This undermines the system's credibility with the public and
the offender, and vitiates the objectives of prevention of recidivism and reformation of the
offender. A corrections system that overruns its resources can produce costly litigation
and the threat of loss of system control to the federal judiciary. A corrections system that
overruns its resources can increase the risk to life and property within the system and to
the public.
76. Thomas Marvell finds that five of the nine states with presumptive guidelines saw
prison growth rates fall after adoption; one exception was Pennsylvania, which rejected earlier
guidelines for being too lenient. Thomas B. Marvell, Sentencing Guidelines and Prison Population
Growth, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 696, 703-04 (1995).
77. For Alaska, see ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(f) (2004) ("Factors in aggravation and
factors in mitigation must be established by clear and convincing evidence before the court sitting
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possible under Blakely. As many commentators predicted, Blakely has led to the
invalidation of the federal guidelines as well (or at least their binding effect).79
And several state courts have already found their presumptive guidelines uncon-
stitutional as well.7 9 These jurisdictions will thus need new sentencing regimes.
without a jury."). For Arizona, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702.01 (Supp. 2005) (allowing thejudge to deviate from the presumptive sentence if aggravating or mitigating factors are found). For
California, see CAL. Cr. R. 4.420(b) ("Circumstances in aggravation and mitigation shall be established
by a preponderance of the evidence."). For Colorado, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(6) (2005)("mhe court shall impose a definite sentence... within the presumptive ranges... unless it concludes
that extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances are present .. "). For Indiana, see IND.CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-7.1 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004) (setting forth aggravating and mitigating factors,
though not establishing the burden of proof), and id. §§ 35-50-2-4 to -6 (establishing sentences for
felonies and allowing judge to depart from the fixed sentence if aggravators or mitigators are
found). For Minnesota, see MINN. SENT'G GUIDELINES IL.D (2006) ("[l]n exercising the discretion todepart from a presumptive sentence, the judge must disclose in writing or on the record the
particular substantial and compelling circumstances that make the departure more appropriate
than the presumptive sentence."). For New Jersey, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(f) (West2005) (instructing the judge to impose the presumptive sentence unless the "preponderance of
aggravating or mitigating factors" suggests otherwise). For New Mexico, see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-
18-15.1A (Supp. 2000) ("The court shall hold a sentencing hearing to determine if mitigating or
aggravating circumstances exist...."). For North Carolina, the burden of proof was initially
preponderance of the evidence, but the legislature amended it in response to Blakely. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 15A-1340.16(a) (2005) ("The court shall consider evidence of aggravating or
mitigating factors present in the offense that make an aggravated or mitigated sentence
appropriate .... The State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, that an
aggravating factor exists, and the offender bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that a mitigating factor exists."). For Ohio, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.14(B)(2)(West Supp. 2006) (The court shall impose the minimum sentence unless it finds such a sentence
"demean[ing]" or inadequate to protect the public.). For Oregon, see OR. REV. STAT. § 137.671 (1)(2005) ("The court may impose a sentence outside the presumptive sentence... if it finds there
are substantial and compelling reasons justifying a deviation from the presumptive sentence.").
For Tennessee, see TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-2 10 (Supp. 2005) (while providing for the judge tofind enhancements, neither this section nor any other appears to establish the burden of proof).
78. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).79. The states that have so far found that their guideline systems violate Blakely are
Arizona (State v. Brown, 99 P.3d 15 (Ariz. 2004)), Colorado (Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713(Colo. 2005)), Indiana (Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679 (Ind. 2005)), Minnesota (State v. Shattuck,
689 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 2004)), New Jersey (State v. Natale, 878 A.2d 724 (N.J. 2005)), North
Carolina (State v. Allen, 615 S.E.2d 256 (N.C. 2005)), Ohio (State v. Foster, 845 N.E.2d 470(Ohio 2006)), and Oregon (State v. Dilts, 103 P.3d 95 (Or. 2004)). And Alaska's legislature has
already amended its guidelines to ensure compliance with Blakely in S. 56, 24th Leg., 1st Sess.(Alaska 2005), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/24/Bills/SB0056A.pdf. The supreme courts
in three other states that use presumptive sentencing regimes have sought to distinguish their
guideline systems from those discussed in Blakely and Booker, but it is unclear whether these
arguments will ultimately prevail. As of now, however, these states are California (People v.
Black, 113 P.3d 534 (Cal. 2005)), New Mexico (State v. Lopez, 123 P.3d 754 (N.M. 2005)), and
Tennessee (State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632 (Tenn. 2005)).
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II. THE EFFICACY OF VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES
Following Blakely, voluntary guidelines provide a way to retain structured
sentencing with judicial fact-finding: Where a presumptive guideline system
requires a particular finding, a voluntary approach simply encourages it. But can
such encouragement alone sufficiently influence criminal sentencing? This part
examines this question empirically, and the results suggest in general that
voluntary guidelines work reasonably well.
To design an empirical test, however, it is first necessary to define a metric
by which to measure "success." This Article focuses on two metrics: (1) Do
guidelines shrink the variation in sentence length; and (2) do they reduce the
role of impermissible factors such as race and sex?
To examine how well guidelines induce consistency, Part II.A.2 explores
the effect of guideline adoption on the "mean difference" of sentence lengths,
which is the extent to which a defendant's sentence differs (in absolute value)
from the average state sentence for his offense." In general, the findings indicate
that voluntary guidelines successfully reduce variation, though not necessarily
as well as presumptive guidelines.
Part ll.A.3 then presents the results for the test looking at how guideline
adoption influences the importance of "impermissible" factors, race and sex in
particular, to sentence length. The results here are more ambiguous. At least
for violent and property crimes, both voluntary and presumptive guidelines are
capable of reducing the use of race and sex, but presumptive guidelines gener-
ally appear to have stronger effects; for drug offenses, both types of guidelines
often appear to have only limited effects. Limitations in the data, however,
imply that these results be viewed as tentative.
There are, of course, other measures of success-the Pennsylvania legis-
lature and the U.S. Congress, for example, adopted guidelines in part because
they felt judges were too lenient, so for them success depends somewhat on
longer average sentences. But reduced variation and less reliance on imper-
missible factors are among the most commonly advanced justifications for
structured sentencing; Part II.A.4 considers in part what the empirical results
presented here imply for other possible justifications.
80. For example, if the average defendant convicted of arson in Virginia in 1997 received a
sentence of ten years, then a defendant convicted of arson in Virginia in 1997 but sentenced only to
three years would have a mean difference score of 7 (10 - 3). Similarly, if the defendant's sentence had
been seventeen years, his mean difference score would also be 7-the score is the same whether the
defendant's sentence is above or below the mean.
A. Two Tests of the Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines
1. The General Model
Both tests discussed in this part draw on the same primary source of data,
the National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) between the years 1989
and 2000. The NCRP takes the prisoner as the unit of observation: Participating
states compile data on each convicted defendant both upon arrival at and
departure from prison. Most important, the NCRP provides data on each defen-
dant's offense, the length of the sentence imposed, and demographic information
such as race and sex.' Sentence length (or a function of it, such as its mean
difference) is the dependent variable in the regressions below, and the remain-
ing variables (such as the inmate's race and sex) are factors that, along with the
presence of guidelines, should influence sentence variation and length. Some
relevant defendant-specific traits, such as the defendant's education, employ-
ment history, and socioeconomic status, or the race, age, and sex of any vic-
tims, are not included only because the NCRP does not provide usable data on
any of these other variables. Appendix 1 provides a more detailed discussion of
the NCRP.
Defendant traits are not the only ones that play a role at sentencing,
however; those of the judge are also important. A judge's political views, race,
sex, and (outside of the federal system) political vulnerability all might affect
the sentences defendants receive. An earlier version of this Article attempted
to explicitly control for these effects, but the tables presented below do so more
indirectly; Appendix 1 discusses the reasons for this shift.
Of the fourteen states providing useful data to the NCRP between 1989
and 2000, two adopted voluntary guidelines during the period (Missouri in
1997 and Virginia in 1995),s2 and two presumptive (Ohio in 1996 and Michigan
in 1999)."3 Moreover, four reporting states used guidelines throughout the entire
81. Unfortunately, the National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) does not record
data about the prisoner's life prior to incarceration-it provides no data on prior criminal history, for
example. The NCRP does contain a variable for prior time spent in prison, but this measures only
the time the prisoner spent in prison (as opposed to jail) awaiting trial for the offense for which he is
currently incarcerated and which can be credited to the sentence he is serving.
82. Virginia initially adopted voluntary guidelines in 1991 and amended them when it revised
its sentencing statutes and adopted a truth-in-sentencing law in 1995. For reasons discussed in
Appendix 1, this Article uses 1995 as the date of adoption. It should be admitted up front, however,
that when 1991 is used, the results for voluntary guidelines are significantly weaker, and are in fact
close to zero. But, as argued in the Appendix, this weak effect seems to understate the true effect of
voluntary guidelines, at least for Virginia.
83. Michigan's guidelines also raise some empirical concerns, which are discussed in
Appendix 2. When the regressions in Part II.A are run distinguishing Michigan from Ohio, the
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period: One (Maryland) used voluntary guidelines, two (Tennessee 4 and
Washington) presumptive, and one (California) a determinate sentencing
law (which is effectively a presumptive system). Finally, six reporting states
(Alabama, Illinois, 5 Kentucky, Nevada, Oklahoma, and South Carolina) did
not use any sort of guidelines throughout the period; these act as a form of
experimental control group.
I ran each regression below separately for each of three classes of crimes,
namely violent crimes, property crimes, and drug offenses. This division is
justified on two grounds. The first is quantitative: As the summary statistics
in Table 2 indicate, the average mean difference and sentence length differ
noticeably across the three categories. The second reason is qualitative: The
psychological impact of the offenses at sentencing likely varies across catego-
ries. Violent crimes, for example, may have the strongest emotional effect on
a judge; property crimes, though still clearly malum in se, lack the visceral
impact of violent crimes. These differences could influence the extent to which
judges adhere to guidelines, look to impermissible and outside factors, or impose
consistent sentences even in the absence of guidelines.
results for Ohio alone are close to those for the aggregate measure of presumptive guidelines, if only
because Michigan adopted its guidelines so late in the sample period. Part 11l.B and Appendix 2
examine Michigan's guidelines and what the data in this Article can say about them in more depth.
84. Technically, Tennessee adopted its guidelines toward the end of 1989, but for reasons
discussed infra note 173, it is not treated as an adopting-in-the-period state.
85. Though nominally a determinate system, the latitude Illinois's sentencing regime
affords judges is quite wide. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable No. Obs. Mean I St. Dev. I Min. Max.
Dependent Variables
Mean Difference
Violent 640,011 35.701 48.464 0 572.971
Property 934,261 22.195 33.059 0 568.733
Drugs 785,789 18.385 30.695 0 571.657
Ln(Mean Difference)
Violent 640,011 2.978 1.183 0 6.353
Property 934,261 2.600 1.012 0 6.345
Drugs 785,789 2.329 1.122 0 6.35
Sentence Length
Violent 640,011 83.331 87.630 1 600
Property 934,261 46.002 51.133 1 600
Drugs 784,434 45.395 51.696 1 600
Guidelines
Voluntary
Violent 640,011 0.072 0.258 0 1
Property 934,261 0.066 0.249 0 1
Drugs 785,789 0.082 0.275 0 1
Presumptive
Violent 640,011 0.560 0.496 0 1
Property 934,261 0.504 0.500 0 1
Drugs 784,434 0.609 0.488 0 1
Demographics
Black
Violent 640,011 0.464 0.499 0 1
Property 934,261 0.412 0.492 0 1
Drugs 785,789 0.536 0.499 0 1
Women
Violent. 639,985 0.051 0.220 0 1
Property 934,192 0.111 0.314 0 1
Drugs 785,762 0.116 0.321 0 1
Within each class of crimes, I ran two specifications of each regression,
differing in the number of states included. The first specification includes
just those four states that adopted guidelines during the period covered by the
data, and the second includes those four plus the other ten states in the sam-
ple. Otherwise, the regressions include the same sets of control variables,
including state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and offense fixed effects. 6
86. State fixed effects control for the possibility that some of the differences in outcomes
between guideline and nonguideline states or between presumptive guideline and voluntary
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These regressions lag the timing of guideline adoption by one year. In
other words, since Ohio adopted its guidelines in 1996, it is not classified as a
guideline state until 1997. This reflects the fact that many criminals sen-
tenced the year a guideline system is adopted are sentenced under preguideline
rules. For example, any criminal arrested or convicted in Ohio in 1995 but
sentenced in 1996 would be sentenced under the preguideline rules. By the
time a year has passed, it is likely that most offenders facing sentencing will
be subject to the guidelines.
a. Endogeneity
As in any test looking at the effect of legislative changes, I must address
the potential problem of endogeneity. No state randomly adopted guidelines or
had guidelines forced upon it by an outside power. The timing of guideline
adoption is therefore endogenous, implying that the guideline coefficients
could be biased. The direction of this bias depends on what forces influence
the timing of adoption, and two possible stories can be told. The first is that
legislatures adopt guidelines when they feel that problems with sentencing are
worsening (when variation is rising, for example). In this case, the bias is
upward, pulling the coefficients toward zero: The negative coefficients pro-
duced in the regressions discussed below would thus understate the true effect
of guidelines. 7 The second story is that legislatures adopt guidelines only when
the problems that concerned them are starting to wane; this could simply be
the result of legislative inaction or perhaps a public-choice story, in which
the targeted group (here, judges) is able to delay implementation of a
guideline states are due not to the guidelines themselves but rather to other, unobserved underlying
state factors (for example, even without guidelines, judges in Virginia might sentence offenders
differently than those in Michigan). Year fixed effects similarly capture the extent to which different
(nationwide) outcomes in different years are due not to the specific policy changes under review but
to other, unobserved events that took place in those years. And offense fixed effects, which are
discussed in more depth in Appendix 1, take into account the fact that "Violent Crime," 'Property
Crime," and "Drug Crime" are broad categories incorporating a diverse array of suboffenses. Judges
may treat these suboffenses (such as murder and simple assault, both of which are elements of
"Violent Crime") differently at sentencing, and offense fixed effects help control for this possibility.
87. The intuition here is the following. On the one hand, the adoption of guidelines should
reduce the variation in sentencing. On the other hand, if legislatures adopt guidelines when
sentence variation is getting worse (larger), then guideline adoption is positively correlated with
increased sentence variation. When variation is regressed on guideline adoption, the resulting
coefficient ultimately accounts for both the negative "real" effect and the positive "correlated" effect,
resulting in a coefficient less negative than the true effect. In other words, roughly speaking, assume
that if guidelines were imposed exogenously, they would on average reduce the mean difference by
ten months, but legislatures in fact adopt them only when the mean difference has risen by three
months. Then the regression will return a result of -7 (-10 + 3) months, not -10 months,
understating the true effect.
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regulation until the problem has lessened. In this case, the bias is negative, and
the negative coefficients returned in the tests below overstate the true effect of
guideline adoption.8
A simple extension can shed some light on the extent to which endoge-
neity is a problem. 9 If the passage of guidelines is in part a function of changes in
the variation in sentencing, for example, then we should observe a trend in varia-
tion prior to guideline adoption; for example, if states adopt guidelines because
variation is worsening, then variation should rise during the preadoption years.
Including some form of state-specific time trends in the regressions run below
addresses this concern. In particular, I consider two adjustments. In the regres-
sions looking at variation, one correction includes a linear state-year trend,
while the other includes both linear and quadratic state-year trends.' For the
impermissible-factors regressions, the corrections are slightly more complex.
Besides the linear and quadratic state-year trends used in the variation regres-
sions, the impermissible-factor regressions include four more trend terms, namely
linear and quadratic state-year-race and state-year-sex trends.9 In other words,
the regressions control not only for possible trends in overall sentence length,
but also for trends in the relative sentences imposed on blacks and women.
Note that from an empirical perspective, Blakely provides a useful (future)
alternative for addressing the problem of endogeneity: It is a random shock to
sentencing practices. Washington State adopted its guideline system endoge-
nously but lost it exogenously; this is true for the other states affected by Blakely
as well. In several years, when sufficient post-Blakely sentencing data are avail-
able, the importance of guidelines can be (re)tested by looking at how sentencing
practices changed when such structures were unexpectedly removed.
88. The intuition here mirrors that in the first case. In this instance, the "real" effect remains
negative, but the "correlated" effect is negative as well, since guidelines are adopted when the
targeted effect (variation, for example) is declining. To recast the example supra note 87, now
legislatures adopt guidelines only after the mean difference has fallen by three months, so the
regression returns a coefficient of-13 months instead of the true -10 months.
89. This approach is derived from Leona Friedberg's examination of the endogeneity of state
unilateral divorce laws. Leona Friedberg, Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from
Panel Data, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 608 (1998). Note that because the possibly endogenous variable in
this model is a state-level legislative outcome while the data are at the individual level, the
instrumental variable approach for addressing endogeneity is inapplicable.
90. In other words, the linear correction includes solely the adjustment state,*year,
, 
while the
linear and quadratic correction (which I will call simply the quadratic correction for ease of
discussion) includes both state,*year, and state,*year,'. Appendix 1 discusses these adjustments in
more depth.
91. Technically, these four new variables are back,*state*year,, back.*state,*year,', sex,*state,*year,
,
and seY*state,*yearj.
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b. A Note About Drug Offenses
Although I run the regressions for all three classes of crimes, the discus-
sion focuses primarily on the results for violent and property offenses. The
tables below include the outcomes for drug offenses as well, but these results are
not discussed at length. In marked contrast to their treatment of violent and
property crimes, states often recodified their drug codes or changed their charging
behavior at the same time they adopted their guidelines. For example, after
adopting its guidelines, Ohio systematically started charging offenders under
possession statutes where earlier it would have sought convictions for
trafficking. 2 In some states there is almost no overlap between the drug charges
for which inmates are admitted before guideline adoption and those for which
they are admitted after. As a result, it is much harder to compare results across
time for drug offenses than for violent and property crimes; perhaps not
surprisingly, the drug-crime results are consistently less statistically significant
and less intuitive than those for the other two types of crimes.
The next two subparts examine the empirical results. The discussions
focus primarily on the results and their interpretations; Appendix 1 provides
the technical details. Part II.A.4 considers the limitations of the regressions and
their implications.
2. Voluntary Guidelines and Variation
Tables 3 and 4 present the results examining how guideline adoption influ-
ences the mean difference in sentences imposed. In particular, I consider two
measures of mean difference as the dependent variable: (1) the mean difference
itself; and (2) the natural logarithm of the mean difference score. The first
approach measures the absolute effect (for example, a coefficient of -5 for the
guideline variable implies that the mean difference falls by five months when
guidelines are used), and the second the percentage effect (for example, a coeffi-
cient of -0.05 for the guideline variable implies that the mean difference falls by
5 percent when guidelines are used). The results in Tables 3 and 4 are consistent
with the hypothesis of this paper: Voluntary guidelines can successfully reduce
variation in sentencing. It is true that presumptive guidelines consistently do a
92. Thanks to James Lowe, an Assistant Prosecuting Attorney for Franklin County, Ohio, for
pointing this out to me. As a result of this change in policy, the fraction of inmates charged with
trafficking in Ohio fell from over 98 percent before the guidelines were employed to 37 percent after
(according to the NCRP).
better job, but Blakely forecloses such options (at least in their current form), and
voluntary guidelines appear capable of picking up some of the slack.
Table 3 provides the absolute-effect results. For example, the first two
coefficients in Column I imply that, without correcting for endogeneity, the
mean difference in sentence variation for violent crimes falls by 9.450 months
under presumptive guidelines and 4.704 months under voluntary guidelines
when the regressions use only the four changing states; the first two results in
Column II imply declines of 13.271 and 10.282 months, respectively, when all
fourteen states are used.9 In Table 4, the dependent variable is the log of the
mean difference, so the coefficients reflect the percentage effect of adoption. In
other words, the regression results in Column I suggest that, before accounting for
endogeneity, voluntary guidelines reduce the mean difference of violent crime by
approximately 8.7 percent when using just the four changing states, compared to
39.2 percent for presumptive guidelines. Column II indicates that when
considering all fourteen states, the adoption of voluntary guidelines appears to
induce a 34.6 percent drop in mean difference, compared to a 57.1 percent drop
when presumptive guidelines are adopted.
93. One thing that is immediately apparent here (and in the results that follow) is that the
outcomes change noticeably when moving from the four changing states to the complete set of
fourteen states. This is likely due to the fact that movement of the mean differences in states that
do not change their guideline policies during the period in question (that is, states that either use
guidelines throughout or never adopt guidelines) differs systematically from such movement in the
adopting states. Results discussed in Appendix 3 indicate that simply omitting California from
the regressions causes the full-state results (now full-state-minus-one) to move closer to the four-
state results; in other words, dropping California causes the results in Column II in Table 3 to
move toward those in Column I (and likewise those in Column IV toward those in Column III),
though the convergence is by no means total. California provides nearly half of the observations
in each dataset-of the 640,011 offenders measured in the violent-crime dataset, for example,
287,704, or just under 45 percent, are from California-and thus may exert a strong influence
over the results. Moreover, not only does California have the largest prison population in the
nation during the same period (even larger than the federal prison population), but its "multiple-
choice" determinate sentencing law is one of the most rigid in the country.
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TABLE 3
THE EFFECT OF GUIDELINE ADOPTION ON DEVIATIONS FROM MEAN
SENTENCE IMPOSED (CORRECTED FOR ENDX3ENEITY)
Violent Crimes
Uncorrected Results Corrected Results
Linear Linear & Quad.
III I1 IV V VI
Guidelines
Voluntary -4.704 -10.282* -2.374 -7.435 -3.798 -6.622
(3.276) (2.561) (5.539) (3.993) (6.316) (4.758)
Presumptive -9.450* -13.271* -3.957* -5.682* -3.481* -3.341*
(1.648) (3.640) (0.399) (1.988) (0.525) (1.420)
Demographics
Black 1.215 1.325* 1.219 1.397* 1.204 1.378*
(1.112) (0.520) (1.114) (0.499) (1.119) (0.494)
Woman -3.552* -2.723* -3.618* -2.692* -3.645* -2.706*
(0.832) (0.425) (0.849) (0.434) (0.860) (0.439)
Offense Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dtunmy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All States No Yes No Yes No Yes
R 2  0.090 0.204 0.091 0.208 0.091 0.209
Property Cnmes
Uncorrected Results Corrected ResultsLinear Linear & Quad.
I II III IV V VI
Guidelines
Voluntary -2.524 -3.611 -1.393 -1.810 -0.468 -1.408
(3.501) (2.252) (2.128) (2.498) (3.122) (3.287)
Presumptive -10.453* -8.918* -2.075 -1.487 -3.743 -1.346
(2.554) (3.667) (1.315) (1.156) (1.554) (2.246)
Demographics
Black 2.216* 0.586* 2.244* 0.622* 2.249* 0.644*
(1.853) (0.256) (0.420) (0.258) (0.420) (0.259)
Woman -2.246 -2.348* -2.251 -2.291* -2.229 -2.262*
(1.853) (0.649) (1.844) (0.624) (1.845) (0.619)
Offense Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All States No Yes No Yes No Yes
Rz 0.242 0.241 0.245 0.247 0.246 0.249
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Drug Crimes
Uncorrected Corrected Results
Results Linear Linear & Quad.
1 II III IV V VI
Guidelines
Voluntary
Presumptive
Demographics
Black
Woman
Offense Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All States No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.158 0.244 0.158 0.252 0.159 0.255
-3.574*
(1.122)
-5.706
(4.119)
-1.637
(0.991)
-2.186*
(0.503)
Notes. The numbers provided in parentheses are robust standard errors, corrected
to reflect state-level clustering; coefficients marked with an asterisk are significant at the
95 percent level. "Offense Dummy" refers to whether the regression includes indicator
variables for each specific suboffense within the overarching crime category; the first
suboffense within each crime category is dropped. "Year Dummy" reflects whether the
regression includes year effects (the first year, 1989, is dropped); and "State Dummy"
whether the regression includes fixed effects (the first state, Alabama, is dropped). "All
States" captures whether the regressions look at data just from the four reporting states
that changed their guideline policies during the period under review or all reporting states.
All guideline variables are lagged by one year. "Linear" indicates that the linear state-year
interaction term is employed to control for endogeneity; "Linear & Quad" indicates that
both the linear and quadratic (squaring the year term) corrections are used.
1.259
(2.030)
-9.294
(3.363)
-4.873
(3.892)
-4.599
(2.033)
-5.632*
(1.788)
-14.025*
(3.024)
-2.029
(1.153)
-2.196*
(0.511)
0.843
(2.471)
-9.976*
(2.643)
-4.854
(3.939)
-4.563
(2.025)
-2.631
(1.538)
-9.898*
(3.105)
-1.714
(1.019)
-2.174*
(0.493)
-2.806
(1.136)
-6.457
(2.964)
-4.842
(3.920)
-4.560
(2.047)
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Several patterns emerge from Tables 3 and 4. First, for both violent and
property crimes, voluntary guidelines appear to reduce variation, although pre-
sumptive guidelines do so more effectively (the coefficients are generally larger
numerically and more significant statistically).14 As mentioned above, the
results for drug crimes are less reliable, since many states changed their charging
patterns when they adopted guidelines. Briefly, though, voluntary guideline
adoption seems to have had less of an effect on drug offenses than on violent
or property crimes, at least in percentage terms.
TABLE 4
THE EFFECT OF GUIDELINE ADOPTION ON THE LOG OF THE DEVIATION
FROM MEAN SENTENCES IMPOSED
Violent Crimes
Corrected Results
Linear Linear & Quad.
1II 111 IV V VI
Guidelines
Voluntary -0.087 -0.346* 0.022 -0.091 -0.042 -0.086
(0.097) (0.144) (0.091) (0.126) (0.070) (0.146)
Presumptive -0.392* -0.571* -0.142* -0.176* -0.125" -0.096
(0.060) (0.186) (0.016) (0.054) (0.026) (0.056)
Demographics
Black 0.003 0.016 0.003 0.022 0.003 0.021
(0.024) (0.011) (0.024) (0.010) (0.024) (0.010)
Woman -0.021 -0.017 -0.024 -0.014 -0.023 -0.014
(0.017) (0.010) (0.018) (0.011) (0.018) (0.011)
Offense Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All States No Yes No Yes No Yes
Rz 0.108 0.236 0.114 0.244 0.114 0.246
94. For property crimes, for example, in absolute terms, voluntary guidelines reduce the mean
difference by approximately 2.5 to 3.6 months, compared to 8.9 to 10.5 months for presumptive
guidelines. In the log regression, voluntary guidelines reduce mean difference by about 5.4 percent to
21.3 percent, compared to 43.4 percent to 54.0 percent for presumptive guidelines.
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Property Crimes
Uncorrected Results Corrected Results
Linear Linear & Quad.
I II III IV V VI
Guidelines
Voluntary 
-0.054 -0.213 0.022 0.021 -0.071 -0.088
(0.151) (0.180) (0.185) (0.256) (0.164) (0.263)
Presumptive 
-0.434* -0.540* -0.149 -0.137 -0.173* -0.133*
(0.045) (0.098) (0.088) (0.150) (0.038) (0.030)Demographics
Black 0.074 0.020 0.076 0.022 0.076 0.023
(0.027) (0.015) (0.027) (0.016) (0.027) (0.015)
Woman 
-0.045 -0.041* -0.045 -0.038* -0.044 -0.037*
(0.048) (0.018) (0.048) (0.017) (0.048) (0.084)
Offense Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All States No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2  0.262 0.268 0.267 0.277 0.271 0.279
Drug Crimes
Uncorrected Results Corrected Results
Linear Linear & Quad.
I II III IV V VI
Guidelines
Voluntary 0.341 -0.032 -0.076 -0.284* -0.362 -0.311*
(0.187) (0.066) (0.140) (0.113) (0.120) (0.115)
Presumptive 
-0.250 -0.650 -0.611 -0.627 -0.332* -0.223
(0.290) (0.386) (0.194) (0.393) (0.036) (0.137)
Demographics
Black 
-0.062 -0.138* -0.060 -0.133* -0.580 -0.131"
(0.084) (0.027) (0.082) (0.028) (0.081) (0.030)
Woman 
-0.046 -0.068* -0.042 -0.067* -0.044 -0.068*
(0.036) (0.015) (0.035) (0.015) (0.036) (0.015)
Offense Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All States No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2  0.304 0.299 0.318 0.304 0.327 0.307
Notes. The numbers provided in parentheses are robust standard errors, corrected
to reflect state-level clustering; coefficients marked with an asterisk are significant at the
95 percent level. "Offense Dummy" refers to whether the regression includes indicator
variables for each specific suboffense within the overarching crime category; the first
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suboffense within each crime category is dropped. "Year Dummy" reflects whether the
regression includes year effects (the first year, 1989, is dropped); and "State Dumnmy"
whether the regression includes fixed effects (the first state, Alabama, is dropped). "All
States" captures whether the regressions look at data just from the four reporting states
that changed their guideline policies during the period under review (Michigan,
Missouri, Ohio, and Virginia) or all reporting states. All guideline variables are lagged
by one year. "Linear" indicates that the linear state-year interaction term is employed
to control for endogeneity; "Linear & Quad" indicates that both the linear and quadratic
(squaring the year term) corrections are used.
Second, correcting for endogeneity has noticeable effects. Consider, for
example, the results in Table 3: Including the adjustments reduces the impact of
both voluntary and presumptive guidelines. It should be noted, however, that
while the absolute efficacy of both voluntary and presumptive guidelines falls, in
general the relative efficacy of voluntary guidelines appears to rise. For example,
with respect to violent crimes, correcting for endogeneity reduces the coefficient
for presumptive guidelines by nearly three-quarters (from -13.3 to -3.3), while
that for voluntary drops by less than half (from -10.3 to -6.6); while the
statistical significance for the voluntary guidelines coefficient falls, it remains
relatively significant in the full-state regressions (at the 90 percent level when
just the linear state-year trend is used, and at the 80 percent level when the
quadratic trend is also included). For property crimes, presumptive guidelines
fall from being nearly three times as effective as voluntary to equally as effec-
tive, albeit at a much lower (and much less statistically significant) level. For
drug crimes, the relative efficacy of presumptive guidelines appears to rise (even
as its absolute effect falls slightly) when the linear trend is employed, but to fall
(from three times as potent to under two) when the quadratic trend is included.
The importance of the time trends can be observed graphically as well.
Figure l(a) plots the average mean difference for violent crimes for the four
states that adopted guidelines during the sample period; the x-axis is normalized
so that for all states "year 0" is the year in which a state adopts its guidelines.
Figure 1(b) repeats this for property crimes, and Figure I(c) for drug offenses. In
Figure l(a), for example, two states have no appreciable preadoption trend
while two others experience declining variation prior to adoption. In Figure
l(b) the results are less consistent: Two states exhibit little preadoption
movement, one sees the problem of variation worsen, and a fourth again sees a
decline prior to adoption. Finally, the patterns in Figure 1(c) are quite similar to
those in Figure 1(a): Two states observe little change prior to adoption, and
two declines.
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FIGURE 1
CHANGE IN MEAN DIFFERENCE OVER TIME
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In short, then, it appears that endogeneity may exert a downward bias on
the coefficients (causing the uncorrected regressions to overstate the true
magnitude of adoption's effect). Correcting this bias, however, weakens the
apparent absolute effect of both voluntary and presumptive guidelines but
increases the relative effectiveness of voluntary guidelines.
Voluntary guidelines thus appear capable of reducing the variation in
sentences imposed, even if not as effectively as presumptive guidelines. At the
very least, the weaker results indicate that voluntary guidelines can continue
some of the work done by presumptive guidelines, especially for violent and
property crimes (where voluntary guidelines appear to be about 50 percent and
40 percent as effective, respectively). The stronger results in this subpart suggest
that voluntary guidelines can accomplish nearly all of what presumptive
guidelines did.
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3. Voluntary Guidelines and Impermissible Factors
Besides reducing variation, guidelines are capable of influencing how judges
rely on so-called "impermissible" factors, such as race. This subpart develops an
empirical test to examine how effectively they do so. In particular, I consider how
the adoption of guidelines changes the importance of race and sex to sentence
length." Appendix 1 provides the technical discussion, and Table 5 presents the
results. The regressions here use four variables not present in the earlier test;
these capture the interactions between race or sex on the one hand and
voluntary or presumptive guidelines on the other, and they measure the extent to
which the judicial reliance on race and sex changes after guideline adoption.96
95. Note that the dependent variable has changed from the first test, from the mean
difference in sentence length to the sentence length itself.
96. In Table 5, these are called "Black*Vol," "Black*Pres," "Sex*Vol," and "Sex*Pres,"
respectively. Thus, for example, in Column 11 of Table 5, being black adds 11.3 months to a
prison sentence for violent crimes, but that that falls by 8.1 months once a state adopts voluntary
guidelines.
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TABLE 5
THE EFFECT OF GUIDELINE ADOPTION ON THE USE
OF IMPERMISSIBLE FACTORS AT SENTENCING
Violent Crimes
Corrected Results
Uncorrected Results Linear Trend Linear & Quad.
Trend
I RI III IV V VI
Race
Black 7.392 11.327* 9.350 11.282* 14.935 13.884*
(2.716) (2.477) (3.938) (2.939) (5.225) (2.765)
Black*Vol 
-3.036 -8.119 6.617 -4.214 0.947 -4.73
(7.310) (5.556) (8.507) (4.081) (6.320) (5.389)
Black*Pres 1.580 -12.017* -12.822 -15.346* -10.847* -15.558*
(5.439) (2.244) (6.002) (3.636) (2.296) (3.127)
Sex Sex 
-18.039* 
-21.979* 
-20.963* 
-21.395* 
-18.970* 
-26.227*
(4.387) (2.596) (3.932) (5.122) (3.062) (5.596)
Sex*Vol 2.214 2.323 14.144 7.732 0.539 3.741
(6.510) (3.049) (7.339) (5.519) (1.914) (4.663)
Sex*Pres 6.310* 14.096* -10.72 12.874 -1.559 17.096*
(1.669) (3.176) (3.609) (7.231) (0.967) (7.186)
Guidelines
Voluntary 
-4.126 -12.196 -9.214 -10.321 -3.265 -7.538
(11.179) (6.037) (3.756) (5.553) (4.683) (7.858)
Presumptive -64.714* -64.969* -24.738 -26.855 -26.197 -26.052
(6.439) (19.176) (8.186) (18.184) (8.452) (17.391)
Offense Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All States No Yes No Yes No Yes
R 2 0.356 0.416 0.365 0.423 0.368 0.425
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Property Crimes
Corrected Results
Uncorrected Results Linear & Quad.
Linear Trend Trend
1 11 III IV V VI
Race
Black 1.748 0.265 -0.129 -2.478 1.704 0.051
(0.600) (0.775) (3.260) (1.394) (3.703) (1.033)
Black*Vol 2.292 -2.242 -5.28 -5.929* -1.551 -3.466
(1.844) (2.973) (2.625) (0.743) (1.444) (1.611)
Black*Pres 5.700* -0.732 9.190 0.693 3.794 -1.994
(1.971) (0.890) (4.129) (1.901) (4.301) (1.672)
Sex Sex 
-4.98 
-9.542* 
-7.519 
-11.247* 
-8.909 
-13.689*
(1.832) (2.304) (2.441) (2.368) (5.129) (2.715)
Sex*Vol 6.967 9.212* -11.623 -6.068 -0.269 2.120
(7.020) (3.548) (6.418) (4.339) (2.767) (3.138)
Sex*Pres -5.135 6.927* 13.507 14.202* 4.385 14.528*
(7.259) (2.605) (4.931) (2.401) (5.178) (2.963)
Guidelines
Voluntary -11.867 -5.546 0.898 -1.619 -1.49 -3.057
(7.311) (6.077) (3.190) (2.673) (4.235) (4.024)
Presumptive -33.348* -23.163* -14.09 -10.958* -11.563 -8.576
(7.673) (9.978) (6.212) (5.064) (7.199) (6.611)
Offense Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All States No Yes No Yes No Yes
Rz 0.350 0.310 0.362 0.319 0.362 0.322
Drug Crimes
Corrected Results
Uncorrected Results Linear Trend Linear & Quad.
Trend
I II IRc IV V VI
Race
Black 3.548 -0.729 -3.645 -2.197 -17.27 -1.07
(6.846) (4.270) (2.891) (3.999) (7.529) (4.742)
Black*Vol 
-1.102 0.726 -5.085 -4.680* -4.131* -4.269*
(6.391) (4.440) (2.298) (0.523) (0.841) (1.708)
Black*Pres 
-0.737 3.006 2.466 1.442 2.082 0.220
(4.693) (4.179) (10.006) (3.392) (1.606) (4.327)
Sex
Sex -3.76 -7.327 -2.414 -7.404* -4.517 -9.073*
(4.236) (1.751) (6.361) (2.483) (6.409) (2.160)
Sex*Vol -4.158 -0.724 8.257 0.194 5.147 3.277*
(4.058) (1.768) (5.280) (3.182) (2.423) (0.458)
Sex*Pres -0.63 3.940 -0.426 6.094* -1.249 7.639*
(4.406) (1.900) (2.489) (2.600) (1.115) (2.599)
Guidelines
Voluntary -29.888* -23.782* -13.064* -12.420* -10.22 -13.667*
(1.169) (3.263) 2.884 (1.377) (4.230) (1.903)
Presumptive -17.628 -11.446 -9.933 -5.742 -12.726* -7.346
(9.810) 10.305 (10.317) (5.489) (2.706) (4.160)
Offense Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All States No Yes No Yes No Yes
R 
2  0.563 0.508 0.567 0.516 0.568 0.518
Notes. The numbers provided in parentheses are robust standard errors, corrected
to reflect state-level clustering; coefficients marked with an asterisk are significant at
the 95 percent level. "Black*Vol" is the interaction between the "Black" and 'Voluntary
Guideline" indicators; "Woman*Vol" is likewise defined for women, and "Black*Pres"
and "Women*Pres" for presumptive guidelines. "Linear" indicates that the linear correc-
tions for endogeneity are used, "Linear & Quad" indicates that both the linear and
quadratic corrections are used.
One feature immediately apparent in Table 5 is the ambiguous role of race
on sentence length (the overall impact of being black on sentence length is the
coefficient for "Black" in that table). While blacks generally face longer sen-
tences, in many cases the effect of race is close to zero: For property crimes, for
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example, being black appears to add no more than two months to a prison
sentence, and for drug crimes blacks often seem to face shorter sentences. These
results are consistent with current studies. Robert Sampson and Janet Lauritsen,
in a comprehensive review of the literature on race's role in the criminal justice
system, argue that (1) much of the earlier research finding racial bias at
sentencing suffers from important methodological flaws, and (2) the current (and
improved) work often finds little or no evidence of overt racism. 97 It is true, of
course, that sentencing is but one part of the criminal justice system, and the fact
that race does not necessarily play a strong role at sentencing does not imply it
plays no role in that system overall. 9 This Article, however, concerns itself only
with the role of race at sentencing.
Moreover, it is important to note that a positive coefficient for race does not
necessarily imply that blacks are being discriminated against by judges. Race is
correlated with other factors that legitimately influence sentence length, and
unfortunately the spare nature of NCRP data prevents the tests from accounting
for them. For example, black defendants tend to have longer criminal histories
than their white counterparts, 99 and they thus would likely face longer average
sentences even if judges were wholly race blind. Since the NCRP does not pro-
vide a measure of past criminal history, the coefficient for race measures the net
effect of both issues.' ® Moreover, no ready proxy suggests itself, especially since
at present there appears to be no state-level national dataset on prior criminal
histories or recidivism rates. ' In future work, I plan to look at data gathered by
97. Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Crime and Criminal
Justice in the United States, in ETHNICITY, CRIME, AND IMMIGRATION 311, 346-52 (Michael Tonry
ed., 1997). Even when racism seems to play a role, its effect is not always immediately clear. Robert
Sampson and Janet Lauritsen cite a study, for example, that found that courts in New York treated
low-level black drug offenders better than white ones, but black "kingpins" worse. Id. at 347.
98. Sampson and Lauritsen, however, point out that the actual relationship between race and
the criminal justice system is highly complex. They argue that research "hals] not been kind to a
simplistic 'discrimination thesis' and that "the most compelling evidence concerning racial
discrimination in the administration of justice involves community and national constructions of
'moral panics' and political responses to those contexts." Id. at 362.
99. Id. at 346-47.
100. In fact, the coefficient for race further reflects all other factors that are potentially appropri-
ate at sentencing and are correlated with race (such as age, education, or even the nature of the victim).
101. The only comprehensive study of recidivism seems to be PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID
J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED
IN 1994, at 1 (June 2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf, which consid-
ers the recidivism of prisoners released only in the year 1994 and only for a subsample of states (which
includes some, but not all, of the states under consideration here). Moreover, information available
from the Bureau of Justice Statistics implies that state criminal history data are not available in a single,
unified dataset but rather are maintained by each state individually. See Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Criminal Record Systems Statistics (2006), hrtp://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crs.htm ("Criminal records are
maintained by each State in a central repository .... ); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
the individual states to provide sharper insights into both the effect of guide-
lines on the use of race and sex and the attendant welfare implications.
However, that the NCRP does not allow me to estimate the magnitude
(or even the net direction) of the bias from missing correlates is not as prob-
lematic as it might initially appear. The focus of this test is not on the impor-
tance per se of race and sex at sentencing, but on how that importance changes
when guidelines are adopted. To the extent that these omitted variables do
not change over time (for example, to the extent that the relative differences
between black and white criminal histories and their importance at sentencing
do not change over time), their omission does not alter the results. Of course,
an assumption of no change whatsoever is surely too strong to make. Adopting
guidelines that pay explicit attention to past criminal history in score
calculations, for example, likely alters such history's importance at sen-
tencing.' 2 Given the magnitude of some of the effects discussed below, it is
likely that the tests developed here overstate the impact of both voluntary and
presumptive guidelines (for example, it is perhaps unlikely that either type of
guideline reduces the use of race as strongly as the results below indicate). It is
not possible, however, to make any predictions about the effect of the omissions
on the relative efficacy of the two types of guidelines. These results thus provide
a first cut at measuring the importance of presumptiveness, but they are not
definitive. Future work with state-gathered data will, I hope, provide more
significant results.
Looking at the relationship between guidelines and race in Table 5, sev-
eral patterns emerge. First, only for violent crimes does race appear to play a
meaningful role. For both property and drug offenses, the effect of race on
sentence length is numerically small (with one exception never more than
3.6 months) and never significant at the 5 percent level. Not surprisingly, the
effects of guideline adoptions are also numerically small and with only a few
exceptions statistically insignificant."3 Second, focusing on the results for violent
crimes that consider the full set of reporting states, voluntary guidelines appear to
reduce the use of race, albeit not as effectively as presumptive guidelines. Blacks
SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2001 (Aug. 2003), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sschis01 .pdf.
102. Note, however, that not all states have the same detailed grading of past criminal
history that the federal system employs (although some do). Ohio's criminal code, for example,
simply permits judges to sentence repeat offenders either to the longest sentence in the guideline
range (which is otherwise usually not permitted) or to impose a sentence of up to ten years greater
than that otherwise authorized. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.14(D)(2) (West Supp. 2006).
103. Interestingly, the guideline coefficients are significant only for voluntary guidelines (in
column IV for property crimes and in columns IV, V, and VI for drug offenses), and in each case, blacks
face lower average sentences and guideline adoption appears to exacerbate this effect. See Table 5.
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face sentences that are approximately 11.3 months (or 14 percent) longer than
those of whites,'0 4 and voluntary guidelines reduce this effect by 72 percent,
compared to 106 percent" for presumptive guidelines. The results for pre-
sumptive guidelines do not change much with the corrections for endogeneity,
while those for voluntary guidelines fall by approximately half. It should be
noted that the effects of presumptive guidelines are consistently more statisti-
cally significant than those of voluntary guidelines, especially in the presence of
the endogeneity adjustments.
For sex, the underlying effect is much less ambiguous: Across all specifica-
tions, women face shorter sentences than men, and both types of guidelines con-
sistently reduce this gap, though to varying degrees. For violent crimes, for
example, voluntary guidelines reduce the differential by 11 to 36 percent; pre-
sumptive guidelines, by 60 to 65 percent. For property crimes, the effect of vol-
untary guidelines is more scattered, ranging from exacerbating the differential by
54 percent to reducing it by 97 percent. The results for presumptive guidelines
are more consistent, reducing the gap by 73 to 126 percent. Finally, for drug
crimes, voluntary guidelines generally have little effect-in one specification
they reduce the differential by 36 percent, but in the other two the effect is essen-
tially zero both numerically and statistically-while presumptive guidelines
reduce the gap by 54 to 84 percent. Note that the endogeneity controls
consistently influence the coefficients for voluntary guidelines more noticeably
than those for presumptive guidelines.'" Also, as with race, the effects of pre-
sumptive guidelines are consistently more significant statistically.0 7
Thus, at least for violent and property crimes, both voluntary and
presumptive guidelines appear to reduce the use of race and sex, often to
104. The average sentence length for violent crimes is approximately eighty-three months.
Recall that this difference does not necessarily reflect discrimination, since the data do not control
for such race-correlated factors as prior criminal history. See Table 5.
105. A result greater than 100 percent implies that the use of guidelines leads to a reversal in
"bias." In other words, a 106 percent change means that if blacks received sentences one hundred
months longer than whites before guideline adoption, they receive sentences six months shorter after.
See Table 5.
106. In general, the clear graphical evidence of endogeneity seen in Figure 1 is not present here.
107. In an earlier version of this Article, I attempted to sharpen the above results by allowing
the underlying use of race and sex to vary between voluntary-, presumptive-, and nonguideline states.
In particular, I included four new terms that interacted the race or sex indicator with new variables
indicating whether a state adopted voluntary or presumptive guidelines at any point in the sample.
In other words, the new indicator for presumptive guidelines equaled I for all observations from
Ohio, not just those that came after the state adopted guidelines.
While this refined model produced seemingly more precise estimates, it is likely that such
improvements were spurious. The new indicators were highly collinear with guideline-effect
interaction terms, casting doubt on the standard errors. And perhaps more tellingly, the underlying
net effects did not change much with the new terms, and the R2 terms changed by at most 0.001.
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(numerically, if not statistically) significant degrees. In most cases, presumptive
guidelines work better than voluntary, but voluntary guidelines are nonetheless
sometimes effective: The shift from the former to the latter is neither costless
nor crippling. These results, however, are not as favorable toward voluntary
guidelines as those in the mean difference regressions (although they are also
more tentative).
4. Qualifications and Concerns
Though the empirical tests presented above attempt to account for many
of the factors that influence sentence variation and sentence length, they do
not address all of the possible empirical issues. This subpart considers the impli-
cations of six possible problems: (1) The adoption of a particular type of guideline
system is an endogenous decision; (2) the data do not indicate whether
guidelines affect the decision to incarcerate in the first place; (3) prosecutorial
behavior may matter in guideline jurisdictions; (4) guidelines may affect the
relative mean sentence length across (rather than within) types of crimes in ways
correlated with race; (5) jurisdictions have competing definitions of "success";
and (6) jurisdictions that did not adopt guidelines may still change their behavior
in response to the examples set in those jurisdictions that did adopt.
a. Endogeneity Revisited
The tests developed above controlled for the fact that states did not adopt
guidelines at random times. But there is a second type of endogeneity present
here as well. Not only is a state's decision when to adopt guidelines not random,
but neither is its decision about what type of guidelines to adopt, namely,
voluntary or presumptive. The legislature in Virginia, for example, may have
felt comfortable adopting voluntary guidelines in part because it appoints and
retains the judges responsible for implementing them. In this case, endogeneity
may be troubling because it suggests that voluntary guidelines work in Virginia
because of a factor not easily exportable to other states: the means by which
judges acquire and keep their jobs.'
108. An earlier version of this Article developed a logit model to examine what factors
influenced the adoption of guidelines. Although the model returned some useful results in the
binomial case (when voluntary and presumptive guidelines were treated simply as "guidelines"), in
the multinomial case (when voluntary and presumptive guidelines were treated as two different
choices) the results were weak and ambiguous. Moreover, due to limitations in the data, neither the
binomial nor the multinomial model could shed any light on the role of sentencing variation or the
use of impermissible factors on the decision to adopt guidelines in general or to choose between
voluntary and presumptive guidelines.
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And there is some (weak) evidence in the data that this is a potentially
valid concern. As suggested by Figure 1, Virginia and Missouri (which elects
its trial judges) observe distinctly different results when each adopts guidelines.
In regressions not reported here, I disaggregated the effects of Missouri and
Virginia on the mean difference of sentence length. For violent and property
crimes, the results are consistently stronger for Virginia.) 9  Conversely,
however, Missouri's guidelines appear more effective at combating variation in
drug sentencing, an effect that grows stronger as I control for endogeneity.
These results, at least for violent and property crimes, do not necessarily
indicate that Virginia's method of judicial selection is central to its superior
output. For example, the data here do not indicate why Missouri, unlike
Virginia, faced a downward trend in mean difference prior to adoption, and the
method of judicial selection is only one of many differences between Missouri
and Virginia. Moreover, as discussed in more depth in Appendix 1, the
effectiveness of even Virginia's guidelines appears to have turned in part on
their particular design, implying that the effectiveness of guidelines can be
sensitive to the way the ranges are set, even keeping judicial selection methods
constant. But the differences in coefficients do indicate that it is an issue
worthy of further consideration.
b. The Decision to Incarcerate
The second concern is that the data from the NCRP consider the fate
only of those defendants admitted to prison. The results here thus speak only to
how guidelines influence criminal sentencing given that incarceration is the
punishment; they do not consider how much guidelines affect the decision to
incarcerate in the first place. For example, these results indicate that voluntary
guidelines reduce the use of race at sentencing for violent and property crimes,
but they do not say anything about how much judges still rely on race when
initially choosing between incarceration and probation for such crimes. This is
not a minor concern: In 2001, there were nearly four million people on
probation-1.96 million of them for felony convictions-compared to just over
109. For example, for violent crimes, the effects on mean difference without controlling for
endogeneity are -10.922 for Virginia and -9.462 for Missouri, with both significant at the 5 percent
level. With the linear controls, however, the coefficients are -13.613 for Virginia and -2.573 for
Missouri; with the quadratic controls, the results are -12.146 and 1.659, respectively. Moreover, only
Virginia's results are significant at the 5 percent level. For property crimes, the results are more
dramatic. Without controlling for endogeneity, the coefficients are -6.179 for Virginia and -0.995
for Missouri. With the linear controls, the results are -5.745 and 0.904; with the quadratic controls,
the results are -5.494 and 3.75 1, respectively. All of Virginia's results are significant at the 5 percent
level, but Missouri's results are significant at 5 percent only with the quadratic controls. See Table 5.
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1.3 million in prison." ° However, while the tests here do not address the
incarceration-or-probation decision directly, they still might shed light on the
issue. No theory immediately suggests itself that can explain why guidelines
would successfully regulate judicial behavior when it comes to choosing only the
length, and not the type, of sentence imposed. Moreover, the theories that
potentially explain why judges adhere to voluntary guidelines, discussed in Part
II.B below, point toward guidelines working equally in both cases. That said,
the number of defendants on probation indicates that this is an important
open question.
c. The Role of Prosecutorial Charging Decisions
The third potential problem with the data used in this Article is that they
provide information only on the offense for which the defendant is ultimately
convicted, not for which he was arrested or with which he was initially charged.
The data thus do not account for the effect of prosecutorial charging decisions
and how the adoption of guidelines might change such choices. In other
words, even if guidelines induce judges to sentence identically all those charged
with and convicted of second-degree kidnapping, for example, the guidelines
could also influence how prosecutors choose who gets charged with second-
degree kidnapping, as opposed to first-degree, in the first place. The question,
then, is whether the adoption of guidelines influences such prosecutorial
charging decisions. If it does, then some of the apparently salutary effects of
adoption may be ephemeral: While the adoption of guidelines may reduce the
effect of race within a given offense category, it may change the racial distribution
across categories, and the data used here measure only the within effect."'
It is not clear, though, that this is a particularly serious concern for the
results presented here, at least for violent and property crimes. First, Terance
Miethe, focusing on sentencing in Minnesota, has compiled evidence that
prosecutorial behavior does not necessarily change noticeably following the
adoption of guidelines."' Miethe notes that numerous formal and informal
110. LAUREN E. GLAZE & SERI PALLA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BULLETIN:
PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2003 (July 2004), available at http://www.csdp.org/
research/ppus03.pdf.
111. For example, the adoption of guidelines could result in less racial bias within a given
crime class (such as second-degree kidnapping), but it could also induce prosecutors to pay more
attention to whom they assign to each class (so perhaps relatively more blacks are charged with first-
degree as opposed to second-degree kidnapping once guidelines are employed). To the extent that
the data look only at the sentences within a class, not the choice between classes, they do not
account for this effect.
112. Terance D. Miethe, Charging and Plea Bargaining Practices Under Detenrinate Sentencing: An
Investigation of the Hydraulic Displacement of Discretion, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155 (1987).
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constraints prevent prosecutors from exercising their discretion too freely. For
example, differing evidentiary requirements for various offenses can make it
hard to substitute across crimes, and "courthouse subculture[s]" can discourage
such behavior by prosecutors."
Second, the coarseness of the NCRP data helps: The NCRP uses broad
definitions of offenses, such as kidnapping and aggravated assault, not first-
degree kidnapping and third-degree aggravated assault. While one can imagine
prosecutors changing the degree of kidnapping charged in response to the use
of guidelines, it is harder to envision them changing the overall offense (from,
say, assault to aggravated assault). And there appears to be little shifting across
the subcategories of violent and property crimes; while there is some change in
the distribution of offenses before and after guidelines are adopted, it is not
particularly dramatic.'1 4  Of course, as noted above, there are significant
changes in the distribution of drug offenses. However, at least at first blush
these changes appear to be the result less of selective prosecution tactics and
more of systematic changes in the drug codes and in charging practices more
generally. Nonetheless, these distributional changes make it harder to draw
meaningful implications from the results for this class of crime.
d. Guidelines and Structural Effects on Race
Fourth, even if prosecutors do not change how they charge defendants,
guidelines can still in some ways exacerbate the effect of race or sex (even if
they reduce its use in others). As pointed out above, the tests in Part II.A.2
consider only how guidelines affect the variation in sentence length within
offense classifications (such as manslaughter, aggravated assault, petty larceny,
and so on), but not how they affect the average sentence length across
offenses. For example, assume that arson is committed predominantly by black
offenders and assault by white offenders. If guidelines push up the mean
sentences for arson and reduce the mean sentences for assault, even as they
induce judges to impose consistent sentences within each offense category
(and even if prosecutors do not change their charging behavior), then the
guidelines have reduced the use of race directly (by encouraging more consis-
tent intraoffense sentencing), while increasing it indirectly (by changing the
relative average sentence lengths of race-correlated offenses).
113. Id. at 157.
114. And what changes exist are at least partially due to forces other than the guidelines.
Throughout most of the period in question, crime rates dropped as prison populations rose, suggesting
that increasingly marginal offenders were being incarcerated. This would imply that the distribution
of offenses committed by those incarcerated should change as well.
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Note, of course, that such an effect need not imply racism. In the preced-
ing example, if prior to guideline adoption arson is thought to be relatively
underpunished compared to assault, then the readjustment in means might be
socially beneficial, even as it increases the relative average time a black
offender spends in prison. Though differential impact is often read to imply
racism, '"5 such a claim can be made only following a deeper exploration of why
such differences exist."6 The limited data available in the NCRP allow us to
examine how relative means shift following guideline adoption and the
correlation of these shifts with the racial distribution of offenders, but they do
not allow us to draw any further conclusions about whether these results arise
from conscious or unintentional racial bias.
In general, the data from the NCRP do not point to a single, clear result.
In both Michigan and Missouri, for example, sentence lengths for both violent
and property crimes appear to rise more for offenses for which blacks were more
likely to be convicted. Conversely, in Virginia, the opposite result obtains.
And Ohio splits the difference: For violent crimes the relationship between
changes in sentence length and relative number of black offenders is nega-
tive, but for property crimes it is positive. These results, by no means conclusive,
suggest that in some situations (though, as Virginia indicates, not in all) the
adoption of guidelines leads to slightly longer sentences for crimes that are rela-
tively more the domain of black offenders. Whether such a change is the result
of racism (intentional or otherwise), random coincidence, or the rational
response to differences in the social costs of the crimes is an important question,
but it is one beyond the scope of this Article.
It should be noted that even if guidelines tend to increase the mean sen-
tence lengths of black-dominated crimes, this is not a result of guidelines per se,
but rather of how legislatures opt to design them. The results in Part II indicate
that judges respond to the guidelines imposed on them by legislatures." 7 Thus,
the credit or blame for the changing distribution of means rests not on the
inherent nature of the guidelines, but on how the legislatures and sentencing
commissions set the ranges. In other words, nothing in this discussion has
115. Tonry, for example, argues that the war on drugs' disparate effect on black communities
reflects, at best, a willful disregard of racial bias. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT 82 (1995).
116. Randall Kennedy claims that the problem with the war on drugs is that it does not
enforce the drug laws enough, and that the deleterious effects of the crack epidemic on black
communities were so strong as to merit profound responses. Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal
Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1255 (1994).
117. The results from Virginia in particular suggest that this could be an important effect: Sen-
tencing behavior changed markedly after Virginia narrowed its guideline ranges in 1994. This effect
is discussed in more depth in Appendix 1.
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any bearing on the (abstract) efficacy of guidelines, only perhaps on how legis-
latures opt in some situations to establish them.
e. Different Measures of Success
A fifth concern with the tests above is their definitions of "success," namely
a reduction in either variation or in the use of impermissible factors. Two
potential difficulties arise: (1) These goals need not be universally desirable;
and (2) there may be other outcomes policymakers wish to accomplish. First,
reduced variation and reduced reliance on race or sex are not necessarily
inherently positive outcomes. Consider variation first. A sentencing regime
that sentences all offenders for all crimes to ten years in prison, for example,
would have no variation (and no use of impermissible factors, at least following
conviction), but this outcome seems unappealing. Some variation is good: After
all, the goal of guidelines is not to sentence all offenders similarly, but to
sentence like offenders similarly. Tables 3 and 4 account for this to some
degree by calculating mean differences within suboffenses, which assumes that
we want variation between them: Murderers should face different punishment
regimes than arsonists. But there are unaccounted-for factors that argue for some
variation even within a given suboffense, such as the magnitude of the crime,
the nature of the victim, whether the defendant assisted the government, and
other idiosyncratic details about the crime and the defendant's behavior. This
suggests that guidelines should not necessarily aim to eliminate 100 percent
of variation. Moreover, even if guidelines primarily reduce "bad" variation, this
reduction introduces possible costs of its own. For those offenders who are risk
averse and aware of the general nature of punishment in their state, for
example, reducing variation may increase their propensity to commit crime,
even if the average sentence remains constant."'
Reducing the use of race or sex also need not be a universally accepted
outcome. Consider, for example, the impact of sex on a particular sentence.
To the extent that mothers may play a relatively more important role in the
physical, mental, and emotional development of their children, an argument
can be made for sentencing (some) women differently than men. Unfortunately,
the NCRP does not contain data on whether a defendant has dependent
children, so it is not possible to design a test to see, for example, whether
118. Of course, the opposite result obtains for offenders who are risk loving: Reduced variation
undercuts their willingness to engage in crime. For those who are risk neutral or, perhaps more
likely, fail to take variation into account when deciding to commit a crime (because, for example,
they are unaware of the variation or are incapable of thinking about it due to drug use, mental
handicap, or other such impediment), there is no effect either way.
childless women are sentenced more like men than women with children.
Nonetheless, there are possible arguments to make for justifying different out-
comes for men and women who are otherwise identical.
The second concern with the definition of "success" used here is that
other possible outcomes can motivate policymakers. For example, legislatures
might be concerned about sentence length; Pennsylvania's legislature rejected
an earlier version of its current guideline system, arguing that it was not suffi-
ciently punitive, and the rigid structure of the federal guideline system was
driven in part by a fear of judicial leniency."9 The results in Table 5 indicate
that the voluntary and presumptive guidelines considered here (with the excep-
tion of Michigan's, as discussed infra Part IlI.B, and Missouri's) have led to
shorter sentences, and for some jurisdictions this tradeoff might not be accept-
able. 20 Thus, the claim above that voluntary guidelines "succeed" is limited to
the specific metrics on which I focus (and the acceptability of these outcomes).
f. The Indirect Effect of Guideline Adoption on Nonguideline States
The sixth concern is that it is possible that the adoption of guidelines in
one state (or in an increasing number of states) could influence sentencing
behavior in other, nonguideline states. For example, growing guideline adop-
tion could encourage legislatures in nominally nonguideline states to modify
their criminal codes to address some of the concerns raised about unguided sen-
tencing (without going as far as formally establishing guidelines). Or even in
the absence of legislative action, growing adoption could lead judges in
nonguideline states to pay more attention to how they sentence. The first out-
come is unlikely-if anything, the statutory conditions in nonguideline states
have deteriorated over time. Paul Robinson and Michael Cahill, using Illinois
and Kentucky as case studies, document how criminal codes have become
increasingly convoluted and, at times, contradictory.'2 ' For example, the Illinois
Supreme Court recently interpreted a statutory provision limiting the
imposition of consecutive sentences to trump a separate provision aggravating
119. For a brief discussion of the history of Pennsylvania's guideline system, see Reitz, supra
note 18, at 228. For a detailed analysis of the legislative history behind the federal guidelines, see
Stith & Koh, supra note 73.
120. The effects of guidelines on sentence length are given by the coefficients for
"Voluntary" and "Presumptive," and they are consistently negative. In regressions (not reported
here) run separating the various states, Michigan and Missouri's guidelines seem to lead to longer
sentences, while Ohio and Virginia's lead to shorter sentences. States using guidelines throughout
the period also appear to have shorter average sentences.
121. Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American
Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGs L.J. 633 (2005).
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sentences based on past criminal history; as a result, a recidivist defendant who
pled guilty to five crimes received a sentence less than half that which he
would have been eligible for had he pled guilty to just one.' Robinson and
Cahill also note that the proliferation of statutory crimes often means that
prosecutors can prosecute a given act under several different sections, each with
different penalties.'23 While it is not clear that this "overcriminalization" has
necessarily increased inconsistent sentencing, it is unlikely that it has helped to
reduce it.
Even if other factors, such as judges paying more attention to their own
behavior, counteracted any negative effects of inconsistent codification, the
data available here are unable to observe such an effect. First, the particularly
salient guideline adoptions, namely by Minnesota in 1980 (the first state to
adopt guidelines) and by the federal government in 1984, with implementation
in 1987 (the most high-profile set of guidelines), took place before the data
here start, in 1989. In fact, of all the states that had implemented guidelines or
determinate sentencing laws by 2000, more than half had acted before 1989.
Moreover, trends in sentencing variation in nonguideline states since 1989 do
not exhibit any particular pattern between 1989 and 2000. 24 Though the data
here cannot say anything definitive, it appears unlikely that nonguideline states
changed their behaviors in any significant way.
B. Why Do Voluntary Guidelines Work?
The empirical results in Part IL.A suggest that voluntary guidelines in fact
work. But that is only half of the issue: That they work does not explain why
they work. And the question why is an essential one. Without an under-
standing of why voluntary guidelines work, it is difficult to predict how they
will function in different situations or what steps states can take to make them
more effective. This subpart considers three possible explanations for why
voluntary guidelines work: (1) They provide useful information; (2) legislatures
can threaten to replace them with more mandatory systems; and (3) judges can
be held accountable for noncompliance (outside of appellate reversal).
The first possible explanation is that guidelines, both voluntary and
presumptive, provide information-two types in particular. First, they provide
useful signposts to judges who wish to sentence uniformly but fail to do so in
practice. A judge might sentence two similarly situated defendants differently
122. Id. at 639-40 n.23 (citing People v. Pullen, 733 N.E.2d 1235, 1239 (Ill. 2000)).
123. Id. at 638-39.
124. The lack of any pattern suggests, perhaps, that the overcodification that concerns Paul
Robinson and Michael Cahill has not resulted in significant changes in sentencing behavior.
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without realizing it (and despite a desire to act otherwise), perhaps because he
was in different moods at each sentencing hearing, because he forgot the
exact sentence imposed at the earlier hearing, or because he improperly (but
unconsciously) took into account factors like the defendants' race or sex. By
providing judges with a sense of the proper sentence for each crime, guidelines
(whether voluntary or presumptive) help them combat these unconscious acts.
Furthermore, guidelines provide a metric for evaluating the sentencing
practices of judges. While many, perhaps most, judges aspire to sentence
uniformly, others consciously account for race or sex, or allow their moods to
influence sentencing. For these judges, the first informational effect is not
particularly important. But voluntary guidelines might still be effective here,
not because they provide information to "misbehaving" judges, but rather to
their colleagues. By defining a "proper" sentence, guidelines help judges as a
group to identify and informally sanction such misbehaving judges. The insti-
tutionalist model of judicial decisionmaking posits that institutional norms and
their enforcement can meaningfully restrain judicial behavior.' Guidelines of
either type can help foster and enforce such norms.
The second possible explanation for why voluntary guidelines work is that
that they operate in the shadow of presumptive guidelines. If a state legislature
feels that judges are not adhering to voluntary guidelines, it can threaten to
replace them with presumptive guidelines; Maryland, for one, made such a
threat several years ago (though it uses voluntary guidelines to this day). At
one level, Blakely appears to deny legislatures this tool. If so, then the results
developed here may provide information only on how well voluntary guidelines
worked before Blakely, which is of little interest. But to argue that Blakely
eliminates presumptive guidelines in principle overstates its holding. Rather, it
only eliminates the ability of such guidelines to rely on judicial fact-finding for
upward adjustments beyond the statutory maximum. This leaves available to
legislatures in voluntary guideline states two sticks with which to encourage
compliance. The first is to make the guidelines presumptive but to use sen-
tencing juries to make the necessary factual findings. The second is to use a
hybrid approach in which the findings needed for downward departures are
mandatory, but those for upward departures remain voluntary. Michigan and
Pennsylvania already use methods along these lines. Each of these approaches
is discussed in more depth in Part III infra, but what matters for the discussion
125. See Anne Bloom, The "Post-Attitudinal Moment": Judicial Policymaking Through the Lens of
New Institutionalism, 35 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 219 (2001). The "realist" or "attitudinal" model argues
that judges use their decisions as vehicles for implementing their personal policy preferences. The
growing "institutional" literature posits a wider range of inputs into the judicial decisionmaking
process, focusing in particular on how group membership can alter behavior.
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here is that each allows legislatures to continue to threaten to make voluntary
guidelines more mandatory. These options may be less appealing than pre-
Blakely presumptive guidelines, suggesting that the post-Blakely shadow may
not be as strong as that before Blakely, but the shadow nonetheless remains.
The third possible explanation for why voluntary guidelines work is that
forces other than the threat of reversal induce judges to adhere to them. For
example, judges in Virginia are appointed and retained by the legislature. As
long as the legislature believes in the guidelines it has created, it may prefer to
retain those judges who follow them. Judges might also adhere to voluntary
guidelines if, for example, such practices increased the chances of promotion to
a higher court.
Ultimately, these theories will require empirical evaluation themselves,
since each suggests different methods for encouraging judges to comply with
voluntary guidelines. If the first theory (information provision) is correct, for
example, legislatures and the judiciary need only provide judges with training
sessions about how the guidelines operate and with internal reports on how
well various judges are adhering to the guidelines to induce compliance. But if
the second theory (shadow of presumptive) is more accurate, then legislatures
need to be able to indicate to judges that a threat to make guidelines more
binding is in fact a credible threat. Likewise, the third theory (retention and
promotion incentives) posits that states may need to consider more significant
changes, such as revamping how judges are selected at various levels (or at least
be able to again make a credible threat to institute such changes).
II. THE ALTERNATIVES TO VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES
Though voluntary guidelines have the appeal of retaining structured sen-
tencing with judicial fact-finding, they are not the only form of guidelines
available following Blakely. Commentators have focused primarily on three
other options: (1) the use of sentencing juries; (2) the "uncapping" of guide-
lines (in which the maximum sentence available in each cell of a guideline
chart is the statutory maximum for the offense in question); and (3) the "inver-
sion" of guidelines (in which every aggravator is redefined as the absence of a
mitigator). Unlike voluntary guidelines, each of these systems retains presump-
tive elements. Since presumptive guidelines appear to fight variation more
effectively than voluntary guidelines and often work at least as well at
addressing the use of impermissible factors, there is some appeal to maintaining
binding restraints on judges. It is impossible to state a priori exactly how these
systems compare to voluntary guidelines, but this part fleshes out the nature of
the tradeoffs policymakers will have to consider.
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A. Alternative 1: Sentencing Juries
Sentencing juries26 are perhaps the clearest way to retain the mandatory
nature of presumptive guidelines: Rather than having judges find the necessary
sentencing facts, juries find them. Such an arrangement clearly comports with
Blakely, and it keeps in place the same restrictions on judicial discretion that
existed before Blakely-in fact, it makes them stronger, since judges no longer get
to find the sentencing facts. One state already uses this approach. Anticipating
Blakely by several years, the Kansas Supreme Court held its guidelines system
unconstitutional following Apprendi,'27 and the state legislature responded by
adopting sentencing juries.'28 The majority in Blakely held up Kansas as a model
to follow.
Sentencing juries have two arguments in their favor. The first is that they
have the potential to preserve the presumptive nature of guidelines. As the
results in Subparts II.A.2-.3 indicate, presumptive guidelines appear to reduce
variation more effectively than voluntary guidelines, and they roughly do at
least as good a job at eliminating the use of impermissible factors. To the
extent that jury fact-finding approximates judicial fact-finding (an issue addressed
below), sentencing juries preserve the pre-Blakely sentencing structure.
A second possible, though perhaps more difficult, argument for sentencing
juries is that they better live up to the "spirit" of Blakely than voluntary
guidelines. At the heart of Justice Scalia's opinion in Blakely is a desire to "give
intelligible content to the right of jury trial."'29 Voluntary guidelines satisfy
Blakely not by finding ways to empower juries, but rather by capitalizing on
exceptions present in that case and its precedents. Sentencing juries thus seem
more consistent with a goal of strengthening juries.
The one challenge with using this argument to support the use of sen-
tencing juries, however, is the apparent reason why Justice Scalia wants to
strengthen the role of the jury. Blakely does not appear to be built around the
idea that juries are superior fact-finders--in fact, in a different opinion issued
126. Note that the term "sentencing jury" is ambiguous. It can refer either to a jury that
imposes the sentence itself, or a jury that merely finds whether aggravating or mitigating facts exist;
in the latter case, sentencing remains with the judge, but he can use only those facts found by thejury. This Article uses "sentencing juries" in the second (fact-finding) sense, although there are six
states that allow a jury to impose the sentence itself. See Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony
Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three State Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885, 886 (2004). The six states are
Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia.
127. See State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2001).
128. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4718 (Supp. 2005); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,
310 (2004).
129. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305.
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the same day as Blakely, Justice Scalia explicitly notes that juries are not
necessarily any better than judges.' 0 Instead, the focus of Blakely is on the
(apparently doctrinal, not pragmatic) need for juries to protect legal rights.
Presumptive guidelines create rights for the defendant by making it clear that a
sentence above a certain level cannot be imposed without a specific finding; in
effect, the defendant has a right to the lesser sentence absent this finding.
Justice Scalia makes it clear that only a jury can overturn this right. 3 ' At the
same time, by noting the continuing endurance of Williams, Justice Scalia also
makes it clear that such rights do not exist absent legislative creation. Volun-
tary guidelines, by the very volition built into them, thus never create any
expectation on the part of a defendant in the first place.
It also remains an open empirical question whether sentencing-jury sys-
tems can in fact closely replicate the outcomes seemingly achieved with
presumptive guidelines. In other words, it is not immediately clear that jury-
based presumptive guidelines will reduce variation (and the use of impermis-
sible factors) as well as judge-based presumptive guidelines. Unlike judges, juries
are essentially one-shot players. Not only do the jurors associate with each
other only once, but they often are involved in the formal legal system only
once (at least in such a capacity). This implies that the informal forces that
may induce consensus among judges are less likely to apply to juries.
Furthermore, jurors lack any knowledge of how earlier, similar issues were
resolved. Even if they wished to act consistently, they lack the necessary experi-
ence. And, as Stephanos Bibas warns, jury-imposed sentences would be difficult
for appellate courts to review.'32 Thus, sentencing juries might fail to capture
all the apparent benefits of presumption.
But this problem with sentencing juries can be overstated, since Blakely
requires only jury fact-finding, not jury sentencing. This allows a judge to apply
130. In Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004), Justice Scalia states that, "[wihen so many
presumably reasonable minds continue to disagree over whether juries are better factfinders at all, we
cannot confidently say that judicial factfinding seriously diminishes accuracy." Id. at 356.
131. In Blakely, Justice Scalia notes that, "[in a system that says the judge may punish burglary
with 10 to 40 years, every burglar knows he is risking 40 years in jail. In a system that punishes
burglary with a 10-year sentence, with another 30 added for use of a gun, the burglar who enters a
home unarmed is entitled to no more than a 10-year sentence-and by reason of the Sixth
Amendment the facts bearing upon that entitlement must be found by a jury." Blakely, 542 U.S. at
309. And immediately preceding in that opinion he argues that "[o]f course indeterminate schemes
involve judicial factfinding, in that a judge ... may implicitly rule on those facts he deems important
to the exercise of his sentencing discretion. But the facts do not pertain to whether the defendant
has a legal right to a lesser sentence-and that makes all the difference insofar as judicial
impingement upon the traditional role of the jury is concerned." Id.
132. Stephanos Bibas notes the importance of finality of a jury acquittal. Bibas, supra note 50,
at 338.
the facts found by a jury more consistently than the jury itself might do. But
the sentencing jury nonetheless changes the way such guidelines would
operate. For example, a judge's discretion at sentencing is now asymmetric: He
has flexibility in how he uses what the jury finds, but almost none when it
comes to what the jury does not find. This asymmetry may not hurt a judge's
ability to impose enhanced sentences-Nancy King and Rosevelt Noble have
found evidence that juries can be quite punitive at sentencing, suggesting that
they may be generally willing to find aggravators-but it may restrict his ability
to mitigate. 3 And in a system like the pre-Booker federal system, in which
enhancement and mitigation provisions were effectively mandatory (in marked
contrast to state guidelines),' a fact-finding jury would act much like a sen-
tencing jury (here, a jury imposing the actual sentence).
Justice Breyer raised a second concern with sentencing juries, namely that
they lack the sophisticated legal training of a judge. In Blakely, he asked, "How
are juries to deal with highly complex or open-ended Sentencing Guidelines
obviously written for application by an experienced trial judge?"'' 5 But Justice
Breyer's concern seems far more applicable to the federal system than to state
guidelines. The aggravating and mitigating factors used in state guidelines do
not seem to require extensive legal training,'36 and state guidelines do not
require as much fact-finding as the federal guidelines. 7 In the federal system,
the extensive fact-finding could be problematic-Albert Alschuler notes that
prosecutors in one post-Blakely federal case submitted a special-verdict form
that was twenty pages long, leading him to conclude that "the Guidelines were
not meant for juries'' 8 --but it is unclear whether this would be an issue of
much import for the states. Nonetheless, it is possible that the use of lay juries
could impose some limitations on the nature of guidelines that states can adopt.
133. King and Noble quote numerous prosecutors who appreciate jury sentencing because it
encourages defendants to accept pleas out of fear of the punitive nature of such juries. King &
Noble, supra note 126.
134. In presumptive state systems, judges could not enhance or mitigate without making a
specific factual finding, but making that finding did not then compel them to either enhance or
mitigate. In other words, the presumptive restraint was a only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition.
135. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 346-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
136. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16 (2005) (listing aggravating factors, all of
which a jury should be able to comprehend); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-114 (Supp. 2005)
(listing aggravating factors).
137. Much of the fact-finding that takes place during the guilt phase of a state trial is
reserved in the federal system for the sentencing phase. As a result, sentencing proceedings are
more complex in the latter.
138. Albert W. Alschuler, To Sever or Not to Sever? Why Blakely Requires Action by
Congress, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 11, 13 (2004) (citing United States v. Medas, 323 F. Supp. 2d 436
(E.D.N.Y. 2004)).
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Sentencing juries may also be more expensive than a guideline system.
First, the same procedural protections present in jury trials may apply to jury
sentencing as well,'39 suggesting that jury sentencing may require discovery and
other procedural protections, increasing the cost of sentencing both in terms of
money and time. These protections could also limit the resources that are
available to make sentencing decisions: Presentence reports, for example,
which often contain hearsay evidence, may no longer be admissible.
Moreover, the costs of jury sentencing will rise if bifurcation is required;
Justice Breyer notes in Blakely that bifurcation has already driven up the cost of
capital sentencing.'40 And at least two arguments can be made for required
bifurcation. First, the prosecution may not be able to allege certain facts
relevant to sentencing in the initial indictment, since such facts would preju-
dice the jury during the guilt phase. Unified trials could thus prevent the state
from raising certain relevant sentencing issues. Second, absent bifurcation, a
defendant could find himself in the difficult position of having to argue
contradictory positions. As Justice Breyer suggests, if sentencing facts are
included in the indictment, some defendants could be forced either to make
arguments such as, "I did not assault that person, and if I did, I did not use a
gun," or to leave unaddressed certain sentencing facts for the sake of asserting
innocence unambiguously. Such an outcome is unappealing-to Justice
Breyer, it may even unconstitutionally violate due process."
Note, though, that it is possible to overstate the magnitude of this
problem as well, since bifurcation is necessary only in those cases that actually
involve a jury trial. When the defendant pleads guilty, the jury is needed only
at sentencing (if at all), eliminating the in-the-alternative concerns; when the
defendant opts for a bench trial (or waives the need for a jury at sentencing),
no jury is needed at any point. Currently, fewer than 4 percent of all criminal
cases result in jury trials, suggesting that while costs per jury trial may go up, the
overall impact may be slight.
42
A fourth and final concern is an evidentiary problem with sentencing
juries. Even with bifurcation, it is unclear why evidence considered prejudi-
cial at trial should be permitted at sentencing: Evidence that is prejudicial at
the guilt phase is likely still prejudicial at sentencing. If some evidence is
139. See King & Klein, supra note 50, at 319; see also Blakely, 542 U.S. at 336 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting that sentencing juries will likely require formal evidentiary rules to prevent prejudice).
140. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 336.
141. Id. at 335. Justice Breyer asks, "[H]ow can a Constitution that guarantees due process"
force defendants to make these sorts of in-the-alternative arguments? Id.
142. Bibas points out that 91 percent of defendants accept guilty pleas, 5 percent appear in
bench trials, and 4 percent in jury trials. Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence
Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1150 (2001).
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impermissibly likely to encourage a jury to convict a defendant simply for being
a "bad person," why is it not also likely to encourage it to find aggravating facts
(or to not find mitigating ones) for the same reason? Moreover, it is unclear
that an improper enhancement is inherently any less prejudicial than an
improper conviction. Some enhancements, such as the one considered in
Blakely, have the ability to double the length of time served (if not magnify it
even more). An improper enhancement can have significant implications.
The tradeoffs with sentencing juries are thus clear. On the one hand,
they preserve the presumptive nature of the guidelines used in many states, and
in doing so they may retain the benefits of presumptive guidelines dem-
onstrated in Part II.A. On the other hand, they may result in outcomes less
consistent than those made with required judicial fact-finding, they may
require less nuanced guidelines, they may be more expensive, and they intro-
duce concerns of prejudice. How these tradeoffs influence the relative efficacy
of sentencing juries with respect to voluntary guidelines is ultimately an
empirical question.
B. Alternative 2: Uncapped Guidelines
The second alternative to pre-Blakely presumptive guidelines is
"uncapped" guidelines: Each cell in a guideline grid would contain only a
minimum sentence, with the maximum in every case being the statutory
maximum for that offense. Such guidelines are essentially sets of almost-
mandatory minimums. Based on factual findings made at sentencing, a judge
faces a floor below which he cannot go, but otherwise he is free to set any sen-
tence he wishes. Two states, Michigan and Pennsylvania, use this general
approach,'43 and Bowman proposed it to Congress as a way to make the federal
guidelines comply with Blakely. At least one commentator, writing before
Booker, argued that Congress would likely adopt this approach if it felt
compelled to revise the federal guidelines.' These uncapped guidelines are
143. In both Michigan and Pennsylvania, the guidelines provide ranges of sentences from
which a judge chooses the minimum sentence; the judge remains free to choose any sentence up to
the statutory maximum for the maximum sentence. For example, the guidelines in Pennsylvania
provide a range of fifty-four to seventy-two months for an offender with an offense score of 11 and a
criminal history score of 3. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9721 (West Supp. 2006). When setting
the minimum sentence, then, the judge must choose a sentence within that range, but he is
unfettered with his choice for a maximum sentence. The Pennsylvania guidelines include provisions
for enhancing or reducing the minimum sentence (in the example here, the judge can set a
minimum sentence as low as forty-two months if mitigators dominate aggravators or as high as
eighty-four months if the opposite results), but these do not appear to violate Blakely since they do
not affect the maximum.
144. See Bibas, supra note 50, at 339 ("Raise the Guidelines Maxima-The Most Likely Response").
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permissible under Blakely because of the asymmetry in that decision: Blakely
applies only to upward departures, leaving legislatures free to impose required
judicial fact-finding for downward departures. '
But constitutional permissibility need not imply effective policy. How
well do these guidelines work? In regressions not reported here, I disaggregated
Michigan from the rest of the presumptive guideline states to examine the
effectiveness of its guidelines. These results, however, are tentative, due to a
significant limitation in the data. Michigan adopted its present guideline regime
only at the beginning of 1999, so the NCRP data used here provide only a
single year of (lagged) postadoption data for the state. This temporary lack of
data implies that the empirical results for Michigan are still quite provisional.
In general, Michigan's guidelines appear to have had little effect on the
mean difference for violent or property crimes. The one exception is that
Michigan's guidelines, not Ohio's, seem to drive the drop in mean difference for
property crimes when linear corrections for endogeneity are employed; otherwise,
Michigan's guidelines have a negligible effect. For drug crimes, however,
Michigan's and Ohio's guidelines appear roughly equally effective, except when
the quadratic correction for endogeneity is included. In that case, Michigan's
guidelines again have no apparent effect.
For impermissible factors, Michigan's lack of extensive postadoption data
is even more problematic. As demonstrated in Figure 2, for all three classes of
crimes, the differences between either black and white sentences or male and
female sentences display significant variation prior to adoption. As a result, it
is hard to determine whether any change in the one observation following
adoption is due to the guidelines or to the other forces already influencing
preadoption trends. Not surprisingly, regressions attempting to isolate the
effect of Michigan's guidelines do not produce stable results.
145. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490
(2000)). Booker retains this asymmetry. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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FIGURE 2
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Even if future data indicate that Michigan's guidelines are effective at
confronting variation and the use of impermissible factors, these guidelines still
have the possible drawback of approximating mandatory minimums in an era
in which such sanctions are increasingly under attack. While the guidelines
used in Michigan (as well as Pennsylvania) are not precisely mandatory mini-
mums, since sufficient mitigating evidence can lower the minimum possible
sentence, they nonetheless exhibit much of the (possibly problematic)
asymmetry of true mandatory minimums. Judges have more freedom to depart
upward than under presumptive guidelines, 146 but not downward; this grants
"hanging judges" more latitude without equally compensating their more
lenient colleagues. Magnifying this structural feature of mandatory minimums
is a possible psychological issue. As Bibas puts it, "Judges who were inclined to
split the difference between the minimum and maximum before might be
psychologically influenced by the new, higher maxima and move
upward.... Higher maxima will provide higher mental anchors for defendants,
making sentence bargains seem like larger discounts and the prospect of post-
trial sentencing even more risky."'47 Thus, even more lenient judges may adjust
146. Technically, an increased sentence would not be a departure under this regime, since it
would still fall within the (uncapped) presumptive range.
147. Bibas, supra note 50, at 339.
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their sentencing practices upward, pushing the average sentence up even
higher. And in fact, data from the NCRP support the claim that the Michigan
approach leads to higher sentences. Average sentence lengths in Michigan
rose after its guideline system was adopted in 1999,4 and there is some (weak)
empirical evidence linking it to that policy change.'49
Bibas, focusing on the federal response to Blakely, suggests that if
Congress adopted uncapped guidelines, federal prison sentences would likely
not rise noticeably. He notes that few sentences in federal court involve
upward departures (fewer than 1 percent) and, more important, that most
judges sentence at the bottom of the relevant range, suggesting that they are
not itching to impose larger sentences. 0 But this is a distinctive feature of
the federal guidelines, which appear to be uniquely more punitive than the
judges who apply them. Presumptive ranges in state guidelines are generally
less severe and thus more amenable to upward enhancements. In Minnesota,
for example, 8.1 percent of sentences in 2002 resulted in upward departures,
as did 7 percent in North Carolina in 1996, and 3 percent in Washington in
2003.' And the evidence from Michigan suggests that an uncapped system
can very well result in longer average sentences.
Of course, a change in policy that results in longer sentences is not per
se problematic; what constitutes an "appropriate" sentence length is a diffi-
cult normative question. But at least in the current economic climate, such a
transition is likely to be unappealing to state legislatures. As states continue
to wrestle with large budget deficits, they are increasingly cutting back, or at
least trying to restrain, expenditures on corrections.' 2 It is also possible that
state legislatures are starting to adopt less hard-line views of crime for reasons
unrelated to budget difficulties, perhaps due to still-falling crime rates or a
growing appreciation of the collateral costs of incarceration. 5 ' Thus, while
148. For violent crimes, the average sentence imposed in Michigan was 191.5 months during
1989-1998 and 195.1 months for 1999-2000; for property crimes, 120.6 months during 1989-1998 and
140.8 months for 1999-2000; and for drug offenses, 189.0 months during 1989-1998 and 205.4 months for
1999-2000. If the point of change is 1999-2000 rather than 1998-1999 (to account for the one-year
lag), then the changes are from 191.6 months to 197.4 months for violent crimes, 122.2 months to
142.9 months for property crimes, and 190.8 months to 200.0 months for drug crimes; in these latter
examples, however, there is only one postadoption year (2000). Note that Michigan has not
abolished parole, which may explain why the sentences imposed are so long. MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 791.23 1a (West 1998).
149. In regressions not reported here, the coefficient for the effect of Michigan's guidelines on
average sentence length is often positive and both numerically and statistically significant.
150. Bibas, supra note 50, at 339.
151. See SKOVE, supra note 56, at 11-12.
152. See, e.g., Wool & Stemen, supra note 73.
153. See, e.g., id.
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Bibas may be correct that this is the approach Congress may adopt, it is less
clear whether state legislatures will be willing to accept the risk of longer aver-
age sentences.
The results in Part I.A, however, point to a possible way to address the
concerns that uncapped guidelines both (1) do not sufficiently reduce variation
and the use of impermissible factors and (2) lengthen sentences; and it is one
that Bowman himself has suggested. In his testimony before Congress, Bowman
did not suggest a system exactly like that of Michigan and Pennsylvania, but
rather a hybrid approach: While the guidelines would set forth binding
minimums, they would also propose suggested maximums. In other words, the
Bowman proposal weds mandatory minimums with voluntary guidelines for
maximum sentences.' 4 What, then, is gained (or lost) by adopting this hybrid
approach instead of purely voluntary guidelines? The hybrid approach may
reduce variation more effectively than voluntary guidelines, since it restricts
more firmly the ability for judges to depart in one direction, namely downward.
But then it is not immediately clear that such asymmetry is (at least
normatively) appealing. Moreover, the hybrid approach may also lead to
longer sentences, the benefit of which depends on the financial health of the
state, its underlying crime rate, and other highly contextual factors.
C. Alternative 3: Inverting the Guidelines
A third alternative also draws on Blakely's asymmetry. This proposal sug-
gests establishing guidelines with high presumptive sentences and extensive
sets of downward departures, possibly turning each aggravator into a mitiga-
tor.'55 In other words, if a presumptive guideline system set a base sentence of
ten years for robbery with a five-year enhancement for having a gun, the
"inverted" presumptive system would set the base sentence for robbery at fif-
teen years with a five-year reduction for not having a gun. Though this
approach satisfies the literal holding of Blakely, it suffers from at least two possi-
ble defects. First, it might not pass constitutional muster. The Court warned in
Apprendi that it would view such wholesale inversions skeptically.5 6 At least one
commentator feels that such an approach would be "too gimmicky" to survive
154. See Hearing, supra note 58, at 35.
155. See Bibas, supra note 50, at 339.
156. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490-91 n.16 (2000). Justice Stevens warned that "if
New Jersey simply reversed the burden of the hate crime finding (effectively assuming a crime was per-
formed with a purpose to intimidate and then requiring a defendant to prove that it was not.. .), we would
be required to question whether the revision was constitutional under this Court's prior decisions." Id.
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review, ' 7 although others wonder how aggressively the Court will monitor such
responses to Blakely.'58
Second, even if it were constitutional, an "inverted guideline system" is
not the mirror image of the current presumptive system: Upward and downward
departures are qualitatively different actions, at least in state courts. State court
judges, unlike their federal counterparts, are politically accountable. A judge
who imposes a twelve-month enhancement on a presumptive twelve-month
sentence is likely to be portrayed by the media and viewed by the electorate
much differently than one who allows a twelve-month reduction to a
presumptive thirty-six month sentence for an identical crime, even though the
defendant serves twenty-four months in either case. The former judge comes
across tough on crime, the latter weak. States could again find themselves facing
the prospect of longer average sentences. In a sense, inverted guidelines could
ultimately come to resemble uncapped guidelines like Michigan's. Where
Michigan's guidelines prevent judges from setting lower sentences through
explicit controls, inverted guidelines might prevent judges from taking
advantage of available downward departures through political pressure. As a
result, whatever benefits and costs exist with the asymmetry in Michigan's
system ultimately may apply to some degree here as well.
D. Other Alternatives
Though sentencing juries, uncapped guidelines, and guideline inversion
are the leading candidates to replace presumptive guidelines, they are not the
only options. In perhaps the most comprehensive review so far of the alter-
natives, Bibas lists at least three others besides those discussed above: (1) a return
to strict determinacy; (2) a return to indeterminacy; and (3) the expanded use of
appellate review of sentencing. 9 This subpart briefly discusses these possibilities.
As Justice Breyer suggests in his dissent in Blakely, states may adopt strict
deten-ninacy as an alternative to presumptive guidelines.'" A simple strictly
determinate system has the key drawback of treating many cases alike that
surely should be treated differently. It reduces variation and limits discretion,
but at possibly too great a cost. And there is at least weak evidence that states
do not like strictly determinate systems. As discussed supra Part L.A, no state
157. See Bibas, supra note 50, at 339.
158. See Ronald J. Allen & Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker: Constitutional
Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 195 (2005).
159. Bibas, supra note 50, at 338-39.
160. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 330 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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has adopted a determinate system since the 1970s,16' and at least one state that
employed a determinate system in the 1970s, North Carolina, replaced it with
presumptive sentencing guidelines in the 1990s.
A more viable variant is what Justice Breyer refers to in Blakely as a
"complex charge offense"'62 system, in which each crime is subdivided into
numerous detailed "subcrimes." Justice Breyer provides the example of a statute
that defines myriad degrees of robbery, based on what type of institution
robbed, on whether a firearm was used, on whether a death threat was made,
and so forth. 6 1 Such a system may require substantial recodification of a state's
criminal code, although this is a one-time cost that might not be as great as it
might seem. Also, and perhaps more important, a complex-charge-offense
scheme shifts sentencing discretion almost wholly to the prosecutor: By
choosing which specific subcrime or set of subcrimes to charge, the prosecutor
effectively chooses the sentence, or at least the specific sentence range to
which a judge is restricted. Thus a complex-charge-offense approach would
operate much differently than a guideline system, possibly vesting substantially
more power in prosecutors than in judges. Whether this transfer of authority
would be a "good" or "bad" outcome is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is
a key issue policymakers should consider if thinking about such a system.
At the other end of the spectrum of choices is a return to indeterminacy.
As Reitz has noted, indeterminacy is the great unspoken secret of modem
American sentencing. Despite all the attacks leveled against it, and despite the
extensive sentencing reforms imposed around the nation, it remains the domi-
nant form of sentencing, used in some form in twenty-eight states.14 The con-
cerns with indeterminacy are well known, namely that a defendant's sentence
can depend on the judge's mood that day or, perhaps worse, on the defendant's
race or other impermissible factor, and that such idiosyncratic variance in sen-
tences are an affront to the "rule of law." But it is perhaps worth noting that
despite such concerns, a majority of jurisdictions have opted to retain indeter-
minate systems. At some level, legislatures and governors must feel that judges
employ their discretion in roughly acceptable ways.
161. See TONRY, supra note 10, at 28.
162. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 334 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. No state is wholly indeterminate, since every states employs mandatory minimums for
some offenses. See BUREAU OFJUSTICE ASSISTANCE, 1996 NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE SENTENCING
STRUCTURES 8-9 Exhibit 1-4 (Sept. 1998), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/169270.pdf.
And only ten states do not employ any of the major sentencing reforms, namely parole limitations,
sentencing guidelines, truth-in-sentencing laws, or strike legislation. But twenty-eight states employ
neither guidelines nor determinate sentencing regimes. See id. at 10-18.
296
The Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing 297
The efficacy (or lack thereof) of indeterminate sentencing, and the
normative arguments for and against it, however, are not directly relevant to
the goal of this Article. The question considered here takes as a given the idea
that structured sentencing should be retained and asks how to best accomplish
this in light of Blakely; indeterminacy does not accept this underlying
assumption. In their responses to Blakely, judges, legislators, and other
commentators may find themselves rethinking the merits of structured sen-
tencing regimes, but those questions are not part of the project here.
The third suggestion discussed by Bibas is the use of appellate oversight.
Under the system he suggests, guidelines would become "rules of thumb": Judges
could deviate from the guidelines, but they would have to provide detailed
explanations that would be subject to appellate review."' The appeal of this
approach is that appellate courts are better able to ensure uniformity than trial
courts left to their own devices. This is more true the more review is de novo
rather than for abuse of discretion,66 and the more appellate courts are in fact
willing to use their oversight powers. 6 ' How such a system would work in prac-
tice, however, is unclear. Bibas himself seems to indirectly suggest, in a differ-
ent context, that it might not be particularly feasible. When evaluating the
idea of uncapped guidelines, Bibas notes that "searching review" of upward
departures "might make the upper bound seem too law-like and trigger Blakely
protections,' ' s a point forcefully made by Justice Scalia in his dissent in Booker.69
In other words, if appellate review is too strenuous, it creates a situation identi-
cal to that of a presumptive guideline system, and the need for jury fact-finding
returns. Appellate review then ceases to be an alternative to guideline sen-
tencing but simply changes who is imposing the guidelines. Perhaps appellate
courts could limit the ability of judges to depart downward, but then appellate
review begins to mimic uncapped guidelines. And while appellate courts might
be able to regulate the procedures used at sentencing, it is unclear whether such
review would have much effect on the substantive outcome.
165. Bibas, supra note 50, at 338.
166. Id.
167. Reitz, for example, notes that Pennsylvania's appellate courts appear not to review
meaningfully sentences imposed by trial courts. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and
Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1441, 1471 (1997).
168. Bibas, supra note 50, at 339.
169. As Justice Scalia states in his dissent in Booker, "[A]ny system which held it per se
unreasonable (and hence reversible) for a sentencing judge to reject the Guidelines is indistinguishable
from the mandatory Guidelines system that the Court today holds unconstitutional." United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 311 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington will likely compel
at least thirteen states to revamp their sentencing regimes. In each of these juris-
dictions, the maximum sentence a defendant faced depended, at least in part, on
facts found by a judge (rather than a jury); Blakely held that such fact-finding
violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment jury right, and it thus invalidated a
key element of these sentencing regimes. Not surprisingly, many commentators
and judges have confronted the issue of how to redesign such sentencing laws
to comply with Blakely's requirements.
While much of the discussion has focused on three possible reforms--using
juries at sentencing, replacing guidelines with what amount to somewhat-flexible
sets of mandatory minimums, and inverting guidelines so that judges need only
find mitigators (many of which would be the inverse of earlier aggravators)-one
option that has received little attention is the use of voluntary sentencing
guidelines. Because Blakely imposes the jury right only on required fact-finding,
such guidelines pass constitutional muster. Moreover, as this Article demon-
strates, these guidelines appear to work: Judges seem to adjust their sentencing
behavior in response to voluntary guidelines. In particular, the data examined in
this Article suggest that judges operating in voluntary guideline regimes sentence
more consistently and with less attention to the race and sex of the defendant
than do judges operating without any guidelines at all; this effect appears to take
place both between states (comparing voluntary guideline states to nonguideline
states) and within states (comparing a state before and after it adopts voluntary
guidelines). Voluntary guidelines are not a perfect solution-judges working
under now-invalid presumptive guidelines and determinate sentencing laws
were even more consistent and paid less attention to race and sex-but they
are a viable post-Blakely alternative.
Ultimately, legislators and other policymakers will have to compare the
benefits (and costs) of voluntary guidelines to those of the other possible alter-
natives, such as fact-finding sentencing juries and uncapped guidelines. But
the results in this Article, if not conclusive, indicate that voluntary guidelines
represent a viable replacement for unconstitutional presumptive guidelines.
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APPENDIX 1. THE DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 7 '
The primary source of data for this Article is the National Corrections
Reporting Program (NCRP)."' The NCRP is a voluntary program in which
states collect detailed information about each admitted inmate both upon entry
to and departure from prison. Among other things, the states gather data on a
prisoner's offenses, sentences imposed (total maximum, total minimum, and
single-longest sentence), and demographic data such as race and sex. Thirteen
states have participated in the NCRP since its inception in 1983, and by 1998
thirty-one states were reporting meaningful data; the data have become more
reliable as the years have passed.'
In this Article, I use data gathered by the NCRP between the years 1989
and 2000. During this period, fourteen states consistently reported data. Of
these, two adopted voluntary guidelines during the period (Missouri in 1997
and Virginia in 1995), and two presumptive (Michigan in 1999 and Ohio in
1996). One used voluntary guidelines throughout the whole period (Maryland),
two used presumptive throughout (Tennessee 7 and Washington), and one
used a determinate sentencing regime throughout (California)."'7 The remaining
six (Alabama, Illinois, 7 1 Kentucky, Nevada, Oklahoma, and South Carolina)
never employed guidelines during the period.
Note that while I classify Virginia as a voluntary guideline state starting
in 1995,76 Virginia initially adopted voluntary guidelines at the state level in
170. These appendices provide a more detailed discussion of the data and empirical techniques
used supra Parts II.A.2 and II.A.3.
171. The codebooks and data for the NCRP are available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
NACJD/ncrp (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
172. For a brief discussion of the problems with NCRP data, especially in its earlier years, see
Ilyana Kuziemko & Steven D. Levitt, An Empirical Analysis of Imprisoning Drug Offenders, 88 J. PUB.
EcON. 2043 (2004).
173. Because Tennessee implemented its guidelines in 1989, this Article does not count it as a
guideline state until 1990. However, it is not included as a "during-the-period" adopter since it has
only one preadoption year. The corrections for endogeneity focus on preexisting trends, which cannot
be calculated for Tennessee (one year cannot indicate a trend). It therefore makes more sense to
include it only in the regressions using the full set of states.
174. Other than Tennessee, these states adopted their sentencing regimes prior to 1983, the
first year NCRP data were gathered.
175. For an explanation of why Illinois-nominally a determinate sentencing state-is
classified as a nonguideline state for this Article, see supra text accompanying note 59.
176. 1 am not alone in doing this. Reitz similarly classifies Virginia as a voluntary guideline
state as of 1995. Reitz, supra note 18, at 226 tbl.6.1.
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1991. '77 When it developed its truth-in-sentencing law as part of a large
sentencing-reform bill in 1994, however, the legislature narrowed the guideline
ranges available to judges and expanded the number of categories of crimes
covered by the guidelines. 7  For example, the sentence range for selling a
schedule I or II drug for an offender with no record and no other offenses fell
from over four years to under one, and the range for two counts of grand lar-
ceny committed by an offender on parole with a prior for grand larceny fell
from four and a half years to two and a half years. For violent crimes, some of
the drops were even more dramatic: The sentence range for robbery of a resi-
dence with a firearm (but no injury) committed by an offender with no record
fell from over ten years to barely over three, and that for a class of rape with a
firearm by an offender with a prior fell from twenty-seven years to just over sev-
enteen years. This narrowing appears to have had a strong effect on how con-
sistently judges sentenced, particularly for violent and property crimes, as
shown in Figure A.'79 As a result, the regressions in this Article treat Virginia
as having adopted its guidelines in 1995.' 0 This decision is ultimately an impor-
tant one. When 1991 is used as the year of adoption rather than 1995, the results
for Virginia are much weaker. For violent crimes, for example, the effect of
voluntary guidelines on variation when all the states are used falls from -10.282
to -7.204 (with both coefficients significant at at least the 5 percent level); when
only the four changing states are used, the drop is from -4.704 to -0.727. It is
clear from Figure A why this happens, but it is also clear that this appears to
understate improperly the true effect of voluntary guidelines. Moreover, Figure A
indicates the importance of how legislatures and commissions design guidelines.
177. For a comprehensive discussion of the development of Virginia's guidelines, see BRIAN
J. OSTROM ET AL., TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING IN VIRGINIA 10 (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/1 87677.pdf.
178. See id. at 30-32.
179. To fit all three types of crimes on one graph, Figure A subtracts thirty months from the
annual average mean difference for violent crimes.
180. At some level, for the years 1991-1994 this is analogous to treating Illinois, nominally
a determinate sentencing state, as indeterminate due to the wide ranges its determinate sen-
tencing law provides.
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FIGURE 3
MEAN DIFFERENCE IN SENTENCES IN VIRGINIA
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In all the regressions, the dependent variable is "longest sentence
imposed" or a function of it (its mean difference)."' The observations included
in this Article, however, are only those for which the longest sentence is less
than or equal to six hundred months (fifty years). This affects two types of sen-
tences. First, this drops offenders sentenced to life, life plus years, life without
parole, or death. This is partially a concession to coding. The one alternative,
using an actuarial approach (if the expected age of death for a twenty-five year
old prisoner sentenced to life without parole is sixty-five years, then he has
effectively received a forty-year sentence), has the problem of creating the
appearance of variation where none exists. A judge who sentences both a
twenty-year old defendant and a thirty-year old defendant to life without parole
for identical crimes is sentencing consistently (with no variation), but the actu-
arial approach would result in his sentences appearing inconsistent. If the
question is, "Do judges apply the law consistently?" then the actuarial approach
can produce false inconsistency. Furthermore, these sentences are also dropped
to prevent any small pockets of outliers from skewing the results. Second, even
181. The alternatives are "minimum sentence imposed" and "maximum sentence imposed."
Minimum sentence lengths are reported with much less frequency than maximums, and both
maximum and minimum sentence lengths are clouded by multiple offenses for which sentences are
imposed concurrently. The "longest sentence imposed" variable provides a measure of the sentence
imposed for a singl (and generally the most important) offense.
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though sentences greater than six hundred months (but not officially "life" sen-
tences) could be included,'8 2 it seemed illogical to do so when they often act
effectively as life sentences. Moreover, such extreme outliers could again exert
undue influence over the regression coefficients. Ultimately, very few offenses
result in such draconian punishments: Dropping life and death sentences omits
approximately 1 percent of the observations, and only a small number of sen-
tences exceed six hundred months.
In an earlier version of this Article, I attempted to incorporate rough
measures of differences across states in judicial behavior as well. Since the NCRP
does not provide any information specifically identifying the offender in a given
observation, it is impossible to tie the offender to the judge who sentenced him.
Instead, a more indirect measure was considered: the means by which a state
selects its judges. The approaches states use vary, from partisan and nonpartisan
elections, to legislative appointments, to nominations by merit commissions
with retention elections.'83 Unfortunately, during the period under review in this
Article, no state changed its judicial-selection procedures, which means that
indicator variables for judicial-selection methods are redundant in the presence
of state fixed effects. As a result, these measures were ultimately dropped.
For the first empirical test in this Article, examining the effect of guide-
line adoption on the mean difference in sentence length, I use the following
regression:
dif = a + 5volguide, + 8ipresguide + 8ibblack. + vsex, +
qstate, + oyr + (oOffense. + (1)
where dif,. is the mean difference score for offender i convicted of crime j in
state k in year t. volguide, = 1 if state k employs voluntary guidelines in year t,
and presguide = 1 if it uses presumptive guidelines in that year. black. = 1 if i is
black, and sex = 1 if i is a woman. Finally, state, is the state fixed effect variable,
yr the year fixed effect term, and offense. the offense fixed effect dummy. This
last set of fixed effects deserves discussion. The NCRP subdivides each of the
three general classes of crimes into subcrimes: There are nineteen types of
violent crimes (such as murder, homicide, rape, aggravated assault, and so on),
fifteen types of property crimes, and ten types of drug offenses. Without the
offense-specific dummies, the regression in equation (1) implicitly assumes that
all offenses have the same (unconditional) average mean difference; including
182. The NCRP includes some observations for which the sentence length was apparently
over 12,000 months.
183. The American Judicature Society provides a detailed discussion of these various approaches.
See American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection Methods, http://www.ajs.org/selection/sel-state-
select-map.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
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the offense dummies allows each suboffense to have its own average mean
difference, which seems more realistic. Since the coefficients of interest in
equation (1), 8 and 8,, are state-level terms while the unit of observation is the
individual, the standard errors are corrected for clustering.
I ran the regression in equation (1) six times, once for each of three classes
of offenses-violent crime, property crime, and drug offenses-and then twice
within each crime class, once using data taken just from the four states that
adopted guidelines during the period 1989-2000, and once using data from
the full sample of fourteen states. The regressions for drug offenses differ slightly
from those for violent and property crimes. In particular, I included an extra
set of dummy variables, interacting the state fixed effect with the offense fixed
effect. This is a concession to an aggregation problem that appears to result from
the unique recodification of drug offenses following guideline adoption.
Without these indicator variables, the aggregate effect of presumptive guideline
adoption for all offenses is greater than its effect on any one suboffense. Even
with these variables, the aggregate effect of presumptive guidelines appears
slightly larger than such guidelines' effect on any one suboffense, but the
overstatement is essentially eliminated.
To calculate the percentage effect of guideline adoption on mean differ-
ence, I replaced the dependent variable in equation (1), difjk,, with its natural
logarithm. More precisely, I took the log not of the mean difference itself,
but of one plus the mean difference (that is, the dependent variable is now
y4 = ln(1+ diff,)).'84 This accounts for the fact that many observations of the
mean difference are between zero and one. While ln(x) dampens the distance
between two values of x greater than one, it magnifies the distance between two
xs less than one (and greater than zero). In other words, the distance between
ln(.5) and /n(.3) is .5, more than twice the distance between 0.3 and 0.5.' s
This effect is magnified the closer the mean-difference score is to zero.
Otherwise, the regression used to calculate the percentage effect is identical to
that in equation ( 1 ).Is6
The corrected versions of equation (1) presented in Tables 3 and 4 are
simple extensions of that regression. To correct for any possible state-specific
time trend, I multiplied each state's state fixed effect term, statek, by the year
184. Note that the use of dif1, or I + dif, does not change the results in the unlogged regression
given in equation (1) (except for the constant).
185. This is because ln(.5) = -0.693, and ln(.3) = -1.204.
186. In the end, the transformation has a strong effect only for drug crimes, where under some
specifications the unlogged regression returned a negative coefficient for presumptive guidelines
while the logged regression (without using the "plus one" correction) returned a positive coefficient,
a logical impossibility. In all cases, adding one to the mean-difference score reduces the absolute
effect of both types of guidelines, as one would expect.
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vector, year, where year is the value of the year vector associated with year t
(for example, year 199 = 1991). Thus, the linear state-year trend regression is:
dif, = a+ 4volguidek, + Jpresguide, + /3bblack, + ysex, + (,statek +
(p yr + (poOffense, + state,*year, + (2)
That with the quadratic time trend is then:
dif,k, = a + 4volguidek, + 65presguide, + /3bblack, + Vsex, + (state +
pyr, + pOoffensei + kstatek*year, + statek*year,' + Ek, (3)
The next test, discussed in Part II.A.3, examines the effect of guidelines
on the use of race and sex at sentencing. The first regression presented in
Table 5 is:
length, = a + 4volguide, + presguide, + /Ioblack, +
/3,(black,*volguide,) + /3,(black,*presguide,) + ysex, +
y,(sex,*voguide,) + Vu(sex *presguidek) + Vstatek + pyr, +
(poffense + , (4)
Here, black,*volguide is the interaction of the race and voluntary guideline
indicators, and the other interaction terms are defined accordingly."8 7 As with
equation (1), I ran the regression in equation (4) six times, once for each class
of crimes, and considering either four or fourteen states, with the standard
errors adjusted to account for state-level clustering. These regressions also
include the additional interaction indicators when considering drug offenses.
The corrected regressions run in Table 5 come from a simple extension to
equation (4). The linear correction is:
length,,, = a+ 4volguidek, + dJpresguide, + /3oblack +
fl(black,*volguide) + / 8,(black,*presguide,) + Wsex +
V,(sex*volguide,) + Vup(sex,*presguide,) + qostatek + Vyr, +
gqoffense + kstate,*year, + 8kblack *statek* year, +
r7,sex,*statek*year, + ej, (5)
The quadratic correction then adds to equation (5) the terms statek*year,
black,*state *year,', and sex,*state *year2.
187. In Table 5, the coefficient for black*volguide, is given by the term for "Black*Vol"; the
coefficients for black,*presguide,, sexY*volguide,, and sexy*presguide, are defined likewise.
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APPENDIX 2. AN ASIDE ABOUT MICHIGAN
One of the two states that this Article treats as adopting presumptive
guidelines between 1989 and 2000 is Michigan, which imposed a presumptive
regime in 1999. The history and structure of Michigan's guidelines, however,
raise two important issues. First, it is possible that Michigan employed presump-
tive guidelines as early as 1984, though these were judicially, not legislatively,
created. If so, then Michigan should not be classified as an "adopting" state in
the models above. And second, the "uncapped" nature of its (current) guide-
lines means they survive Blakely, as the Michigan Supreme Court has recently
held.' This could imply that the strong results for presumptive guidelines in
the regressions above argue for the adoption of Michigan's system.
The history of Michigan's guideline system is a source of some confu-
sion: Three different commentators tell three different stories. Writing in 1996
(before Michigan began the legislative reforms leading to the 1999
guidelines), Tonry classified Michigan's system as a voluntary guideline
approach, s9 while in 2001 Reitz classified Michigan as a presumptive guide-
line state starting in 1999 with no reference to a voluntary guideline past."'
During that time, in 1999, a long-serving Michigan judge, Paul Maloney, stated
that judges in Michigan had operated under a presumptive regime since
1984'91 The guidelines discussed by Maloney were created not by the
legislature, but rather by a judicial committee, and they were made mandatory
not by law, but by an administrative order of the Michigan Supreme Court. 9'
As Maloney notes, however, by the mid-1990s the guidelines had become
somewhat archaic, covering only a fraction of the crimes for which judges had
to impose sentences, 93 and as a result they were becoming less effective.'94
188. People v. Claypool, 684 N.W.2d 278, 286-87 n.14 (Mich. 2004).
189. TONRY, supra note 10, at 27.
190. Reitz, supra note 18, at 227 tbl.6.1.
191. Paul L. Maloney, The Michigan Sentencing Guidelines, 16 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 13,16 (1999).
192. Id; see also Admin. Order No. 1984-1, Sentencing Guidelines, 418 Mich. at lxxx (Jan.
17, 1984).
193. Maloney, supra note 191, at 16-17. New crimes could be added to the guidelines only by
amendment, and the Michigan Supreme Court added no new offenses after 1988, even as the state
legislature continuously added new crimes to the criminal code. Id. at 17.
194. Maloney argued:
Inevitably, when you have significant numbers of offenses not covered by the
guidelines, and you have no changes being made to a system of guidelines-and I am not
here to suggest that we ought to be tinkering like the Federal Commission does every year
or every other year on guidelines-but when the system is not being amended from time to
time, I think its efficacy is eroded significantly, and disparity creeps into the system. When
home invasion, for example, is not covered, but the old breaking and entering statutes are
covered, or when retail fraud is not covered, but the old larceny statute was covered,
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How, then, should this Article classify Michigan's guidelines? On one hand, an
argument can be made that Michigan has been a presumptive regime since
1984, in which case it should be listed with California, Tennessee, and
Washington as a presumptive-throughout-the-period state. On the other hand,
the loopholes described by Maloney are sufficiently large that a crafty
prosecutor might have been able to avoid the guidelines by choosing what
particular offense to charge; in this case, Michigan seems more like a
nonguideline state prior to the 1999 reforms. Ultimately, however, little seems
to turn on the distinction. Classifying Michigan as a presumptive guideline
state throughout the whole period does not change the results in meaningful
ways (in part since Michigan adopted its current guidelines so late in the
sample period).
The second concern stems from the fact that Michigan's guidelines sur-
vive Blakely: Do the strong results for presumptive guidelines argue in favor of a
Michigan-style guideline system? Or are these results the product of Ohio's
more traditional, but now impermissible, approach? When the regressions in
Tables 3 and 5 are run again, separating the two presumptive states, the results
for Michigan are mixed. 95 With admittedly few postadoption observations,
Michigan's guidelines generally have little effect on the mean difference of
violent and property crimes, but under some specifications they do reduce the
mean difference for drug offenses. As for impermissible factors, the paucity of
postadoption data for Michigan makes it impossible to draw even tentative
conclusions. With more waves of NCRP data, I hope to generate more reliable
estimates in the future.
These results imply, then, that Michigan's guidelines may be capable of
addressing some of the concerns raised by this Article, though not all. How-
ever, even assuming the results for Michigan are reliable, commentators have
raised serious concerns about the continued use of mandatory minimums. Even
though Michigan's guidelines (like Pennsylvania's) are not exactly like
mandatory minimums, since judges have the ability to depart downward fol-
lowing specific findings, the asymmetry of the system is still problematic for
those who are seeking to reduce sentence lengths or who are concerned more
generally with the inflexibility of mandatory minimums.
inevitably, there is disparity, because the judges are left unconstrained. Again, it is not any
malevolence, but the bottom line is that left unconstrained without guidelines, more
disparity results.
Id.
195. Part IIL.B discusses these results in more depth.
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APPENDIX 3. THE IMPORTANCE OF CALIFORNIA
One of the fourteen states examined in this Article is California, which
throughout the period in question possessed the largest prison population in the
nation. Since this Article relies on only thirteen other states (not among
which are such prisoner-heavy jurisdictions as Florida, New York, and Texas),
California comprises a large fraction of the data: almost 45 percent of the
observations for violent crime, almost 42 percent of those for property crimes,
and over 52 percent of those for drug offenses. It is possible, then, that
California plays a large role in the empirical results in this Article.
To examine the importance of California, I recalculated the results run in
Parts II.A.2-.3 above with California omitted. In general, California appears to
exert a noticeable influence over the results for violent and property crimes,
though not for drug offenses. In other words, for violent and property crimes,
the results when California is excluded are closer to those that consider only
the four changing states than those that consider all the states. For drug
offenses, the reverse holds, suggesting that omitting California does not
significantly change those results. For impermissible factors, the one difference
from this pattern is that the omission of California does not appear to alter the
results for property crimes in any significant way.

